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I. INTRODUCTION: A MEMORY UNFROZEN 
For two reasons, our generation will bear a heavier responsibility 
for the future of planet Earth than any generation before it. First, 
• Principal Legal Officer, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), Geneva. This study was published originally, under the same title, by the World 
Resources Institute (WRI, Washington, D.C., June 1990). The editorial assistance of Kathleen 
Courrier and Hyacinth Billings of WRI is gratefully acknowledged. Views and opinions ex-
pressed are, however, those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of WRI or 
UNCED. 
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we know better-having gained access to an unprecedented wealth 
of new scientific information and a vastly improved capacity for 
analysis and prediction. Second, we can do better-having accumu-
lated enough experience, technological and institutional, to take the 
necessary international action. 
The first point needs little elaboration. The ongoing research of a 
team of French and Russian palaeo-glaciologists, which has proven 
the link between global warming and "greenhouse gases" in our 
atmosphere, is but one of many examples of the expanding knowl-
edge base. 1 This breakthrough analysis was carried out on a 2000-
metre-deep ice core excavated by the Soviet Antarctic Expeditions 
in Vostok, East Antarctica. Each successive layer of ice in the Vostok 
core contains myriad air bubbles trapped and hermetically sealed-
in the case of the bottom-most layers for up to 160,000 years. By 
crushing the bubbles in laboratories in Grenoble and Saclay (France), 
scientists were able to identify their exact chemical composition by 
gas chromatography, and to determine their age by calculating the 
rate of ice sedimentation. 
The net outcome of this analysis-which involved technology and 
computer calculations more sophisticated than any used even a few 
years ago-was a continuous historical record not only of the Earth's 
atmospheric conditions but also of the corresponding temperature 
changes on the surface of Antarctica. (See Figure 1). The obvious 
next step was to compare this priceless new data base with other 
available information, including similar ice cores from Siple Station 
in Western Antarctica and from Greenland, maritime data from the 
Indian Ocean region, and more recent global monitoring data on 
atmospheric chemistry-such as the continuous carbon dioxide mea-
surements from the Mauna Loa station in Hawaii, which began in 
1958. (See Figure 2). What experts found was that the most recent 
ice-core data for carbon dioxide (C02 ) in Antarctic air matched con-
temporary Mauna Loa measurements of atmospheric CO2 : both show 
a clear and steep upward trend. They also show a consistent corre-
lation between the rise and fall in carbon dioxide, methane (the 
second major "greenhouse gas"), and global temperature, although 
we do not know the details of cause and effect. 
Even more striking than the new empirical evidence contributing 
to our understanding of the greenhouse effect is the degree of inter-
1 Lorius, Jouzel, Raynaud, Hansen & Le Treut, The Ice-Core Record: Climate Sensitivity 
and Future Greenhouse Warming, NATURE, Sept. 13, 1990, at 139-45. See also Siegenthaler 
& Oeschger, Biospheric CO. Emissions During the Past :2000 Years Reconstructed by Decon-
volution of Ice Core Data, 39B TELLUS 140, 140--54 (1987). 
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Figure 1: Long-Term Variations of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, Methane, 
and Temperature in Antarctica. 
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national scientific cooperation through which this evidence has been 
produced. Reconsider the sequence: the Vostok ice core was drilled 
and extracted by Soviet Antarctic expeditions as part of the scientific 
programs authorized under the Antarctic Treaty; under a French-
Russian agreement, the whole sample was analyzed in laboratories 
in France; the data were then compared with other ice-core data 
obtained by Swiss glaciologists at an Australian Antarctic station 
and with atmospheric chemistry data from an American monitoring 
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Figure 2. Correlation of Carbon Dioxide Concentrations from Ice Core 
Measurements. 
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Atmospheric carbon dioxide increase in the past 200 years as indicated by measurements on 
air trapped in old ice from Siple Station, Antarctica, measured by infra-red laser spectroscopy 
(full triangles; Neftel et a!., 1985) and by gas chromatography (open squares; Friedli et a!., 
1986) and by the annual mean values from Mauna Loa Observatory (crosses; C.O. Keeling, 
personal communication). The fullllne is a spline fit through all data. 
Source: Siegenthaler and Oeschger, note 1, p. 141 
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station in Hawaii; and the results were eventually reviewed and 
published in a British science magazine. 
The sequence doesn't end here: the new Antarctic evidence is now 
before the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) set 
up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The IPCC 
used the data in its report to the second World Climate Conference 
in Geneva in November 1990, as a basis for specific recommendations 
for action by governments. 
Clearly, the international machinery for environmental assessment 
is well established and functional. Worldwide scientific cooperation 
on environmental issues includes formal bilateral and multilateral 
channels, as well as informal transnational mechanisms for infor-
mation-sharing and "peer review." While global demand for environ-
mental knowledge has grown enormously, many examples of suc-
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cessful assessment programs are at hand, from the ongoing 
"International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme"2 of the Interna-
tional Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) to the 1987 Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland 
Commission). 3 The question remains: how well established and how 
functional are the institutions and mechanisms that can now translate 
these assessments into collective action? 
As for international environmental management or governance ,4 
most current performance evaluations focus on the structure estab- . 
lished by and after the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment,5 primarily the UNEP and global and regional insti-
tutions formed after UNEP. Yet, international environmental co-
operation did not begin at Stockholm. Conventions for marine pol-
lution control were drafted twenty years earlier by the International 
Maritime Organization (then IMCO). The constitutional mandate of 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for 
the "conservation of natural resources" was formulated in 1945. 
Standards to protect workers against occupational environmental 
hazards were adopted by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) as early as the 1920s. Transboundary agreements for protect-
ing migratory birds and managing shared water resources date to 
well before World War I, as do international arrangements by 19th 
century precursors of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
for sharing atmospheric data. And the first serious, if unsuccessful, 
attempt at global environmental management was probably Theo-
dore Roosevelt's initiative in 1909 to convene a world conference on 
natural resource conservation at The Hague. 
It is time to take stock of this accumulated experience and insti-
tutional know-how, with a view to identifying innovative mechanisms 
for environmental standard-setting and implementation directly re-
2 See Malone, Mission to Planet Earth: Integrating Studies of Global Change, ENV'T, Oct. 
1986, at 6, 6-9; Malone & Correll, Mission to Planet Earth Revisited: An Update on Studies 
of Global Change, ENV'T, May 1989, at 6,6-11,31-35. 
3 See e.g., WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON 
FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. 
4 See generally, H. CLEVELAND, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (1986); 
Myers, Environmental Challenges: More Government or Better Governance?, 17 AMBIO 411, 
412-14 (1988). 
5 See, e.g., R. BOARDMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE CONSERVATION OF 
NATURE (1981); J. EASTBY, FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1985); J. SCHNEIDER, 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL 
LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1979); Smith II, The United Nations and the Environment: Some-
times a Great Notion?, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 335 (1984). 
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lated to some of the decisionmaking ahead. Political scientists have 
referred to these types of mechanisms as international "regimes" 
(that is, "norms, rules and procedures agreed to in order to regulate 
an issue-area"). 6 It may be preferable in this case to define environ-
mental regimes as transnational rather than international,7 consid-
ering that they are not confined to intergovernmental relations be-
tween nation-states and that many are hybrids, partaking of the 
international and domestic legal order, and of the public and private 
law sector. In fact, one of the most significant features of these 
regimes seems to be their ability to switch channels, to change and 
adapt techniques when needed in light of experience-in short, to 
innovate. 
This survey is not intended to evaluate the ultimate ecological 
effectiveness of the substantive policies reflected in each of these 
transnational regimes. Indeed, such an evaluation would require the 
benefit of hindsight over a much longer time span than most of them 
have covered to date. (Twenty years equals ten inches, at best, of 
the Vostok ice core.) What is available, however, is a growing insti-
tutional memory of managerial methods for coping with some typical 
obstacles to effective international environmental governance. 
II. INNOVATIONS IN STANDARD-SETTING 
Traditionally, international standards have been set through trea-
ties. An ad hoc diplomatic conference negotiates and adopts a treaty, 
which then has to undergo national ratification (usually by parlia-
ments) to become legally binding. International environmental law-
making poses no exception to this rule. Typically, therefore, most 
recent proposals for international action on global warming envisage 
a convention on climate change8 or on a "law of the atmos-
6 See INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (S.D. Krasner ed. 1983); Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue-
Linkage and International Regime, 32 WORLD POLS. 357, 358, 397 (1980). On difficulties with 
regime definitions, see Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for 
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 338--39 (1989); and Haggard & Simmons, 
Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491 (1987). 
7 On the distinction, see P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956). 
8 One of the earliest comprehensive proposals to this effect was formulated in 1976 by C. 
TICKELL, CLIMATIC CHANGE AND WORLD AFFAIRS (Harvard Studies in International Affairs 
No. 37) (1977). While some of the points raised therein have since been answered in part by 
the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, opened for signature, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 
9614, and by the Provisions for Co-operation Between States in Weather Modification, U.N. 
Doc. UNEP/GC/8171A (1980) [hereinafter Weather Modificationl, the proposal for a global 
framework convention reappears in a statement by Sir Crispin Tickell to the United Nations 
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phere,"9 along the lines of the United Nations' 1982 Montego Bay 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. 10 
As distinct from national environmental legislation, however, 
treaty rules lain down by conventional diplomatic "ad-hocracy"ll 
have two fundamental drawbacks. First, they are based on the 
consensus or unanimity of all participants because no sovereign state 
is obliged to sign or ratify any treaty. Unlike decisions by a national 
legislature, which normally result in a median standard that is de-
termined by majority vote but also binds the outvoted minority, 
internationally agreed-upon standards thus tend to reflect the lowest 
common denominator, or the "bottomline." Second, parliamentary 
ratification takes time, so the effectiveness of international agree-
ments is deliberately delayed. Unlike national laws-which can fix 
their own dates of application, even allowing for immediate appli-
cability or amendment-multilateral treaties can be brought into 
force, or amended, only after a specified number of signatories ra-
tifies them. The purpose, of course, is to ensure a measure of reci-
procity and to avoid situations in which initial compliance by a few 
diligent parties creates disproportionate benefits to the "free-riders" 
remaining outside the treaty. Setting a threshold number, however, 
also delays implementation to the speed of the slowest boat in the 
convoy. 
It often has been pointed out how antiquated and cumbersome 
this conventional process is. 12 Diplomatic treaty-making may be a 
useful way to formulate principles of behavior and a framework for 
intergovernmental relations. But are traditional treaty techniques 
suitable for effective environmental governance at the global or 
regional scale once international action must pass from declarations 
to operations? Environmental problems frequently involve unfore-
Economic and Social Council (Global Climate Change, Statement by the Permanent Repre-
sentative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, New York, May 8, 1989). Possible 
elements for inclusion in a framework convention on climate change in the United Nations 
Environment Programme World Meteorological Organization (UNEPtWMO) Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are summarized in the -report of the second session 
of IPCC Working Group III, at 33-40, U.N. Doc. IPCC-III/Doc.4 (1990). 
9 For the Canadian and Maltese proposals, see Bruce, Law of the Air: A Conceptual 
Outline, 18 ENVTL. POL'y. & L. 5 (1988); D. ATTARD, CLIMATE CHANGE 11-18 (1989); and 
the statement by the International Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts on Protection of the 
Atmosphere (Ottawa, Feb. 22, 1989). 
10 Final Act, Convention, and Annexes in U.N. Sales No. E.83. V.5 (1983). 
11 Term coined by A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 122-23 (1970). 
12 See, e.g., M. HUDSON, 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, at XIII-LX (1931); C. EAGLE-
TON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 183-201 (3d ed. 1957); C.W. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW 
OF MANKIND 183-84 (1958). 
220 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:213 
seeable changes of circumstances-sometimes under crisis condi-
tions-in the face of continuous scientific-technological progress. 
Critical to successful international management, therefore, is a nor-
mative system's capacity to respond to frequent and rapid change. 
If the classical treaty-that "sadly overworked instrument"13-lacks 
this capacity, what are the alternatives? 
While it is difficult to see how the traditional treaty process can 
be avoided altogether, there are ways to deal with some of its 
shortcomings. A few of such alternatives-in Mancur Olson's terms, 
"politically feasible ways to increase the incentives for collectively 
rational behavior"14-are sketched here in light of practical experi-
ence with transnational environmental standards. 
A. Asymmetrical Standards: How to Beat the Bottomline Rule 
Multilateral agreements based on the lowest common denominator 
are well documented. In international fishery regimes, for example, 
a "law of the least ambitious program" has been diagnosed by a 
Norwegian political scientist, Arild U nderdal: 
Where international management can be established only 
through agreement among all significant parties involved, and 
where such a regulation is considered only on its own merits, 
collective action will be limited to those measures acceptable to 
the least enthusiastic party. 15 
Significantly, though, Underdal goes on to note, a reluctant party 
can often be persuaded to modify its position through "arguments, 
side-payments, or various kinds of political pressure. "16 
Even Underdal's catalogue of exceptions to the rule of the least 
ambitious program is far from exhaustive. As negotiating experience 
in the wider field of international environmental agreements shows, 
options for making ambitious programs or better-than-minimum 
standards attractive to parties include selective incentives, differ-
ential obligations, recourse to regional solidarity, and promotion of 
over-achievement by lead countries. 
13 McNair, The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, 11 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L 
L. 100, 101 (1930); reprinted in A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 739 (rev. ed. 1961). 
14 Olson, Increasing the Incentives for International Cooperation, 25 INT'L ORG. 866, 874 
(1971). 
16 A. UNDERDAL, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: THE CASE 
OF THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC 36 (1980). lowe this reference to Edward L. Miles. 
16 Id. 
1991] GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 221 
1. Selective Incentives 
The concept of "selective incentives" is well established in eco-
nomic group theory17 as one motive for collective action. It simply 
means that certain fringe benefits may persuade a party to partici-
pate in a program or standard that it otherwise would find unac-
ceptable. The familiar parliamentary practice of coalition-building 
and majority-building by judicious distribution of special favors has 
obvious parallels in the negotiation of multilateral treaties. 
A case in point is the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That 
Deplete the Ozone Layer.ls Under article 2(5), production increases 
by way of "transfers" were authorized between small-scale produc-
ers; by virtue of article 2(6), the USSR was granted "grandfather 
rights" for factories under construction until the end of 1990; in 
article 2(8), the Member States of the European Community were 
authorized to aggregate their national consumption limits; and in 
article 5, developing countries were allowed to postpone compliance 
by ten years. 
It is easy to criticize the Montreal text as a compromise full of 
loopholes built in to accommodate special interests. 19 But without 
these "rider" clauses, the agreement would either have lost some 
important signatories or jelled at a lower level of collective commit-
ment. Paradoxically, loopholes can upgrade the overall standard of 
obligations in an agreement-raising them above the predictable 
common denominator. 
In environmental treaty bargaining, the selective incentives com-
monly used are access to funding, access to resources, access to 
markets, and access to technology. Access to funding as an incentive 
to adhere to international conservation standards is perhaps best 
illustrated by the 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage2°-which, with 111 Member States, 
17 See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS 51 (rev. ed. 1971); M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982). 
18 Openedfor signature Sept. 16, 1987,26 I.L.M. 1550 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; see 
also G. LEAN, ACTION ON OZONE (1989); R. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS 
IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (1991); Lammers, Efforts to Develop a Protocol on Chloro-
fluorocarbons to the Vienna Conventionfor the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1 HAGUE Y.B. 
INT'L L. 225-69 (1988); Lang, DiplorruLtie zwischen Oekonomie und Oekologie: das Beispiel 
des Ozonvertrags von Montreal, 43 EUROPA-ARCHIV 105-10 (1988); Szell, The Montreal Pro-
tocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 39 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 278-82 
(1988). 
19 See, e.g., Erlichman, Ozone Pact Full of Holes, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 1987). 
20 Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151; see also Meyer, 
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is the most widely accepted environmental treaty today. Under ar-
ticles 13 and 19 of the Convention, parties are eligible for financial 
assistance from the World Heritage Fund to support conservation 
measures for national sites included in a "world heritage list" if they 
maintain these sites at agreed-upon standards of protection. The 
fund-administered by the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)-now has an annual budget 
of $2.2 million financed by both mandatory and voluntary contribu-
tions and split nearly evenly between projects for cultural and nat-
ural heritage sites. 21 
Access to the sustainable use of natural resources is an economic 
incentive for participating in many international regimes aimed at 
reconciling rational exploitation and conservation: wide-ranging ex-
amples of this incentive include the annual catch quota established 
under numerous regional agreements for marine fishing and seal 
hunting,22 and the worldwide 1946 International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling23 (until the moratorium went into force in 
1986), and the 1980 Canberra Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 24 The acceptance of environ-
mental restrictions in return for the prospect of sharing mineral 
resources is as much a part of the UN Law of the Sea Convention 
as of the 1988 Wellington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Mineral Resource Activities.25 Similarly, access to the world market 
for wildlife and wildlife products, in return for observing agreed-
upon conservation standards, has been recognized as an economic 
incentive for countries to join the 1973 Washington Convention on 
Travaux Preparatoires for the UNESCO World He'ritage Convention, 2 EARTH L.J. 45-81 
(1976); S. LYSTER, INT'L WILDLIFE L. 208-38 (1985). 
21 Situation of the World Heritage Fund and Budget for 1990, UNESCO Doc. SC-89/ 
CONF.004/8 (1989). 
22 See, e.g., E. HEY, THE REGIME FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF TRANSBOUNDARY MARINE 
FISHERIES RESOURCES (1989); A. KOERS, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MARINE FISH-
ERIES: A STUDY OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS (1973); see also S. LYSTER, supra 
note 20, at 208-38. 
23 Dec. 2, 1946, 61 Stat. 1213, T.I.A.S. No. 1597, 161 U.N.T.S. 72; See P. BIRNIE, 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING (1985); Holt, Whale Mining, Whale Saving, 9 
MARINE POL'y 192-213 (1985); J. Scarff, The International Management of Whales, Dolphins 
and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 343-52 (1977). 
24 May 20, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 841; see S. LYSTER, supra note 20, at 156-77. 
25 June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868; see Watts, The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Mineral Resource Activities 1988, 39 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 169-82 (1990); see also THE ANT-
ARCTIC LEGAL REGIME (C. Joyner & S. Chopra ed. 1988); F. VICUNA, ANTARCTIC MINERAL 
EXPLOITATION: THE EMERGING FRAMEWORK (1988). 
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International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES)26 which led to specific quota schemes for marketing "con-
trolled" crocodile hides and (until 1989) ivory. 27 
A more recent addition to the catalogue of selective incentives in 
international regimes is access to technology. This was used first and 
most prominently as an incentive for participation in the 1968 Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.28 While early environ-
mental treaties (such as the UNEP-sponsored regional seas conven-
tions and protocols since 1976) contain only general recommendations 
on technical assistance to developing countries,29 specific provisions 
to facilitate technology transfer have appeared in recent agreements, 
from the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer3° to the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboun-
dary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. 31 In this 
context, the 1990 review of the Montreal Protocol resulted in the 
26 Mar. 3, 1973,27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; 
see D. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: A GUIDE TO CITES (1989); 
Note, Regulation of International Trade in Endangered Wildlife, 1 B.U. INT'L L.J. 249-75 
(1982); Comment, International Trade in Wildlife: How Effective is the Endangered Species 
Treaty?, 15 CAL. W.L.J. 111-60 (1985); van Hoogstraten, The Effectiveness of International 
Law with Regard to Endangered Species, 1986 Y.B. A. ATTENDERS & ALUMNI HAGUE ACAD. 
INT'L L. 157-68; S. LYSTER, supra note 20, at 239-77. 
2'7 See Operation of the Ivory Trade Control System, CITES Doc. 7.21 (1989) (the Secretariat 
report to the seventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties (Lausanne, Oct. 1989». 
28 July 1, 1968,21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; see M. SHAKER, THE 
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION 1959-1979, at 300-
470 (1980); B. SCHIFF, INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: DILEMMAS OF 
DISSEMINATION AND CONTROL (1984). 
29 P. SAND, MARINE ENVIRONMENT LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PRO-
GRAMME 5 (1988) (Barcelona Convention and Protocols, 1976, Art. 11(3»; see id. at 31 (Athens 
Protocol, 1980 Art. 10); id. at 140 (Cartagena Convention and Protocol, 1983, Art. 13(3»; id. 
at 199 (Noumea Convention and Protocols, Art. 18). 
30 Opened for signature Mar. 22, 1985, art. 4(2), 26 I.L.M. 1529, 1531, (1987) [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention on Ozone]; see Lang, Luft und Ozon: Schutzobjekte des V6lkerrechts, 46 
ZEITSCHRIFT FUER AUSLAENDISCHES OEFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOELKERRECHT 261-85 
(1986); Rummel-Bulska, Recent Developments Relating to the Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer, 54-6 Y.B. A. ATTENDERS ALUMNI HAGUE ACAD. INT'L L., 
115-125 (1986); Sand, Protecting the Ozone Layer: The Vienna Convention Is Adopted, ENV'T, 
June 1985, at 18-43; Szell, The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 36 
INT'L DIG. OF HEALTH LEGIS. 839-842 (1985); Tolba, The Ozone Agreement-and Beyond, 14 
ENVTL. CONSERVATION 287-90 (1987). 
31 Mar. 22, 1989, arts. 10(2) & 14, 28 I.L.M. 657, 667, 670 [hereinafter Basel Convention]; 
see TRANSFERRING HAZARDOUS TECHNOLOGIES AND SUBSTANCES: THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL CHALLENGE (G. Handl & R. Lutz ed. 1989); Rublack, Controlling Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Waste: The Evolution of a Global Convention, 13 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 113-25 (1989); Rublack, Fighting Transboundary Waste Streams: Will the Basel 
Convention Help?, 22 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN UEBERSEE 364-91 (1989). 
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establishment of an international trust fund for transferring tech-
nology and financial assistance to developing countries. 32 
Clauses for the preferential acquisition of new environmental tech-
nology have become a major bargaining issue not only in North-
South negotiations but also in East-West relations. For instance, a 
provision on "procedures to create more favorable conditions for the 
exchange of technology to reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides" was 
considered by East European countries (faced with Western export 
restrictions on strategic high technology) as one prerequisite for 
accepting the 1988 Sofia Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution. 33 An intergovernmental task force on 
technology exchange has since been set up under the auspices of the 
Executive Body for the Convention. 34 
2. Differential Obligations 
Because selective incentives by definition lead to special treatment 
for selected parties, they skew an otherwise symmetrical system of 
reciprocal rights and obligations. Such manifest discrimination, par-
ticularly in the case of last-minute "add-ons," can seriously under-
mine the credibility of a multilateral agreement. Consequently, a 
more straightforward alternative is to start out with an asymmetr-
ical regime that does not even pretend to treat states equally, and 
instead differentiates treaty obligations according to each party's 
special circumstances. 
As an example, the European Community's Directive on the Lim-
itation of Emissions of Certain Pollutants into the Air from Large 
Combustion Plants35 of November 24, 1988, lays down a country-by-
country time plan, taking into account the particular economic and 
technological situation in each of the twelve Member States. While 
32 Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, U.N. Doc. UNEPI 
OzL.Pro.2/3, Annex IV: Terms of Reference for the Multilateral Fund (as adopted in London, 
June 1990). 
38 Opened for signature Nov. 1, 1988, art. 3, 28 I.L.M. 214, 217 [hereinafter Nitrogen 
Oxides Protocol]; see Lammers, Second Report of the Committee on Legal Aspects 0/ Long-
Distance Air Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION: REPORT OF THE WARSAW 
CONFERENCE 5-8, 27-40 (1988); Sand, Regional Approaches to Transboundary Air Pollution, 
in ENERGY: PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND CONSEQUENCES 246, 255 (J. Held ed. 1990); 
see also infra note 58. 
34 For a progress report of the task force, see Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution, Report of the Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. EIECEIEB.AIR/20 6-7 (1989). 
35 Council Directive 8816091EEC, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 336) 1 (1988); see also 
Lammers, supra note 33, at 16; Haigh, New Tools for European Air Pollution, 1 INT'L 
ENVTL. AFF. no. 1, at 26-37 (1989). 
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Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany are to reduce their sulphur dioxide emissions seventy per-
cent by the year 2003, the target for Denmark was set at sixty-
seven percent, for Italy at sixty-three percent, and for Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom at sixty percent; at the same time, Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal were allowed to increase emissions temporar-
ily. 
Skewed as these obligations may seem, they resemble the differ-
ential assessment scales that have been developed for multilateral 
funding of numerous environmental agreements. Under the 1976 
Bonn Convention for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution 
by Chlorides,36 for instance, the four riparian countries-the N eth-
erlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Switzer-
land-agreed to share abatement costs (currently estimated at a 
total of $136 million) in percentages of thirty-four percent, thirty 
percent, thirty percent, and six percent respectively. 37 
The various UN trust funds set up since 1977 to finance joint 
programs under the Mediterranean Convention (annual budget $3.8 
million), the Endangered Species Convention ($1.6 million), the 
Transboundary Air Pollution Convention ($1 million), and the Ozone 
Layer Convention ($1 million with the Montreal Protocol) all use 
weighted contributions based on the global assessment scale laid 
down by the UN General Assembly. In this system, countries are 
rated according to a combination of economic, geographic, and demo-
graphic criteria. (The only political limit to this prorated scheme is 
a twenty-five percent "ceiling" for individual contributions, intro-
duced in 1972 at the United States' insistence that no single party 
should be assessed at more than one quarter of the total budget. )38 
Differential scales enable even the smallest countries to participate 
on an equal footing without de-stabilizing a treaty's budget. Indeed, 
under the ViennaIMontreal ozone layer agreements, Singapore con-
36 Dec. 3, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 265 (1977) [hereinafter Protection of the Rhine); see also Kiss, 
The Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 613, 632 (1985); 
Lammers, The Rhine: Legal Aspects of the Management of a Transboundary River, in 
NATURE MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 440-57 CW. Verweyed. 1989). 
Following a technical amendment in 1983 (text in NETHERLANDS TRACTATENBLAD no. 118, 
1983), the Convention was amended in December 1986 by way of a joint declaration of the 
heads of delegation in the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against 
Pollution. 
37 See Protection of the Rhine, supra note 36, at 268-69. 
88 G.A. Res. 29611B, U.N. Doc. Al8952 (1972) (amending "as a matter of principle" the 
scale of assessment that had originally set a maximum of 33.33% (G.A. Res. 14/1, Feb. 13, 
1946), already reduced to 31.52% in 1957). 
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tributes $1500 annually but exercises the same membership rights 
as the United States, which pays $300,000 annually. 
Such skewing is carried one step farther by the "critical loads" 
approach now being developed in the context of the Transboundary 
Air Pollution Convention. As defined in the 1988 Sofia Protocol 
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their 
Transboundary Fluxes, critical load means "a quantitative estimate 
of the exposure to one or more pollutants below which significant 
harmful effects on specified sensitive elements of the environment 
do not occur according to present knowledge."39 
When this approach is translated into national abatement targets, 
it is bound to lead to differential obligations (equitable rather than 
equal) for each party. The basic logic resembles that behind the 
concept of "safe minimum standards"40 in natural resources manage-
ment, which also aims at the equitable allocation of a common prop-
erty resource without jeopardizing its long-term conservation for all 
users. Yet, the transition from "egalitarian" flat rates to highly 
individualized allocations also introduces a new level of complexity 
in environmental regimes-witness the amount of computer time 
now being spent on allocation models. 41 
3. Regionalization 
Custom-built asymmetrical regimes are, of course, more easily 
achieved among regional groups of countries, where economic and 
other trade-offs can compensate for the asymmetries. Furthermore, 
if broadening the scope of an international regime means lowering 
its common denominator (with universal membership at the absolute 
39 Nitrogen Oxides Protocol, supra note 33, art. 3; see CRITICAL LOADS FOR SULPHUR AND 
NITROGEN (J. Nilsson & P. Grennfelt ed.); NORDIC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, MILJO RAPPORT 
No. 15 (1988); Mott, Critical Loads Weighs In, 6 ENVTL. F. 12-13 (1989); Persson, Toward 
Resolution of the Acid Rain Controversy, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 
189-96 (J. Carroll ed. 1988). 
40 See S. VON CIRIACY-WANTRUP, RESOURCE CONSERVATION: ECONOMICS AND POLICIES 
251-58 (3d ed. 1968). To the extent that critical loads start from the concept of a finite 
"ecologically tolerable" level of pollution or other interference with an ecosystem, they may 
also be compared to the concepts of "carrying capacity" in range management or "environ-
mental (receiving, assimilative, absorptive) capacity" in marine pollution management. See 
UNEP, THE STATE OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, GESAMP REPORTS AND STUDIES No. 
39, at 82 (1990). 
41 On the models developed for this purpose by the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA), see THE RAINS MODEL OF ACIDIFICATION: SCIENCE AND STRAT-
EGIES IN EUROPE (J. Alcamo, R. Shaw & L. Hordijk eds. 1990); Hordijk, Linking Policy 
and Science: A Model Approach to Acid Rain, ENV'T, Mar. 1988, at 17-20, 40-42. 
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bottomline), then the reverse should also be true: restricting mem-
bership should raise the standard, particularly where such restric-
tion reflects an element of geographic or other affinity between 
members. 42 
Does international experience in environmental governance bear 
out this observation? Certainly, the degree of institutional coopera-
tion accomplished under regional agreements for marine environ-
ment protection (see Figure 3)-such as the 1974 Helsinki and Paris 
Conventions for the Baltic and the North Sea43 and the UNEP 
regional seas agreements starting with the 1976 Barcelona Conven-
tion for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against 
Pollution44-has consistently been higher than under comparable 
global regimes, except possibly for ship-based pollution regulation 
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).45 At a time when 
the UN Law of the Sea Convention (with its chapter XII on global 
protection and preservation of the marine environment) has still not 
entered into force, more than fifty states are already legally bound 
by conventions and protocols concluded under UN environment pro-
42 On the importance of group size, see M. OLSON, supra note 17, at 21. "Regional" groups 
in this context do not have to be geographically contiguous, as illustrated by the non-contiguous 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) groups. 
43 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Mar. 
22, 1974, 13 LL.M. 544 [hereinafter Convention on the Baltic]. Regional cooperation in the 
North Sea had been initiated by the 1969 Bonn Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with 
Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, June 9, 1969, 704 U.N.T.S. 3 (extended to other harmful 
substances in 1983) and the 1972 Oslo Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Feb. 15, 1972, 11 LL.M. 262. See de Yturriaga, Regional 
Conventions on the Protection of the Marine Environment, 162 RECUEIL DES COURS DE 
L'AcADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.L] 319 (1979); D. Fluharty, International 
Regulation of Access to and Use of Resources in the Baltic Sea (1977) (University of Michigan 
Ph.D. thesis); COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY FOR THE BALTIC: AN ENVIRONMENTAL ApPROACH 
(A. Westing ed. 1989); OSLO AND PARIS COMMISSIONS (OSPARCOM), ANNUAL REPORT (June 
1989); The North Sea: Perspectives on Regional Environmental Co-operation, 5 INT'L J. 
ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 1--356 (1990) (edited by D. Freestone & T. Ijlstra). 
44 Feb. 16, 1976, 15 LL.M. 290 [hereinafter Convention on the Mediterranean]. See Boxer, 
Mediterranean Pollution: Problem and Response, 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 315 (1982) 
(overview of cooperative international efforts to control pollution of the Mediterranean Sea); 
P. HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION (1990). 
45 See Johnston & Enomoto, Regional Approaches to the Protection and Conservation of 
the Marine Environment, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA 285--385 (D. Johnston 
ed. 1981); Boczek, Global and Regional Approaches to the Protection and Preservation of the 
Marine Environment, 16 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. 39, 68-70 (1984). See generally Edwards, 
Review of the Status of Implementation and Development of Regional Arrangements on 
Cooperation in Combating Marine Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLO-
MACY 229 (J. Carroll ed. 1988). 
228 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:213 
Figure 3. Map Showing Ocean Areas Covered by Regional Conventions for Marine Environment 
Protection. 
Marine Are •• Covered By 
Regional Environmental 
Agreements 
1. Northeast Atlantic 
(Oslo/Paris Conventions 
197211974) 
Z. Baltic 
(Helsinki Convention 1974) 
3. Mediterranean 
(Barcelona Convention 1976) 
4. Persian / Arabian Gulf 
(Kuwait Convention 1978) 
5. Antarctic 
(Canberra Convention 1980) 
6. Gulf of Guinea 
(Abidjan Convention 1981) 
7. Southea.t Pacific 
(Urna Convention 1981) 
8. Red Sea 
(jeddah Convention 1982) 
9. Caribbean 
(Cartagena Convention 1983) 
10. Indian Ocean 
(Nairobi Convention 1985) 
11. Southwest Pacific 
(Nournea Convention 1986) 
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grams for the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the West-Central Af-
rican coast, the Red Sea, the Gulf, and the Southeast Pacific.46 And 
while UNEP's own global guidelines on offshore mining (1982) and 
on land-based marine pollution (1985)47 generated little more than 
lip-service from governments,48 many countries did accept specific 
regional commitments and emission standards under the UNEP-
sponsored Athens (1980) and Quito (1983) protocols on pollution from 
land-based sources49 and under the Kuwait (1989) protocol on pollu-
tion from exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf. 50 
But if regionalization can raise the level of standards, it can also 
introduce further asymmetries or reinforce existing ones. Far from 
offering a panacea for all transnational environmental problems, 
regional regulation may be manifestly unsuitable for some. For in-
stance, when the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) in 1984 initiated a regional draft convention for 
trans boundary shipments of hazardous wastes,51 it was able to draw 
on a higher level of solidarity and consensus among its membership 
(limited to Western industrialized states) than would have been con-
ceivable under a worldwide treaty. On the other hand, it soon became 
clear that the very prospect of tightened waste controls in the OECD 
region had an undesired spill-over effect, reorienting trade flows to 
46 See P. SAND, MARINE ENVIRONMENT LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT 
PROGRAMME (Natural Resources and the Environment Series, No. 24, 1988) (texts and mem-
bership lists of the various conventions and protocols). 
47 Id. at 226, 235; see QING-NAN MENG, LAND-BASED MARINE POLLUTION: INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENT 163-210 (1987). 
48 See U.N. Docs. UNEPIGC.13/9/Add.1 (1984) and UNEPIGC.15/9/Add.2 (1989) (progress 
reports to the UNEP Governing Council). 
49 P. SAND, supra note 46, at 27, 103. See S. KUWABARA, THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE 
PROTECTION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AGAINST POLLUTION FROM LAND-BASED SOURCES 
(Natural Resources and the Environment Series, No. 15, 1984). For example, emission stan-
dards for mercury were adopted under the Athens Protocol in 1987. MEDWAVES, No. 10/IlI, 
at 4 (1987). Limit values and water quality objectives for cadmium compounds and for DDT 
levels were adopted in 1989. MEDWAVES, No. 18/III-IV, at 3-6 (1989). 
50 Signed on March 29, 1989, under the auspices of the UNEP-sponsored Regional Orga-
nization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME), pursuant to the Kuwait 
Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Pollution, Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133. For a summary of ongoing cooperation, for 
instance on the occasion of oil spills as a result of military attacks on offshore platforms during 
the Iran-Iraq War, see Gerges, Satellite in Action in ROPME Sea Area, SIREN, Mar. 1989, 
at 23-26. 
51 See OECD, TRANSFRONTIER MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: PROCEEDINGS OF A 
SEMINAR ON LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS (held in Paris June 12-14, 1984) (1985); 
OECD WASTE MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP, MONITORING AND CONTROL OF TRANSFRON-
TIER MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: OECD ACTIVITIES 1983-1989, OECD Doc. ENVI 
WMP/89.4 (Sept. 1989). 
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countries outside the region that were unlikely to abide by OECD-
imposed regulation. 52 The OECD Member States eventually had to 
abandon their project in favor of a less ambitious but globally appli-
cable regime under UNEP auspices, the 1989 Basel Convention. 53 
However, with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now draft-
ing a separate regional agreement on the topic,54 the waste trade 
issue will continue to provide trial-and-error lessons in transnational 
regime-building. 
4. Promoting Over-Achievement 
To be sure, the Basel Convention does not prevent additional 
regional action. Article 11 actually reserves the right of any party 
to enter into other arrangements that are "not less environmentally 
sound" than the agreed-upon global standards. The European Com-
munity has already announced its intention to implement the con-
vention by tighter requirements,55 as it previously did with such 
other treaties as the Council of Europe's 1968 Strasbourg Agreement 
on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Detergents in Washing and 
Cleaning Products. 56 (The Strasbourg Convention, which required 
detergents to be at least eighty percent "biodegradable," was up-
staged by a 1973 European Economic Community (EEC) Detergents 
Directive requiring at least ninety percent biodegradability. )57 
52 See GREEN PEACE INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TOXIC WASTES: POLICY 
AND DATA ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1988). See generally 1-3 GREENPEACE, GREENPEACE WASTE 
TRADE UPDATE (1988-1990). 
53 See Basel Convention, supra note 31; see also OECD COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS C(89)1, 
JANUARY 30, 1989, AND C(89)112, JULY 20, 1989, OECD Doc. ENViWMP/89.4 (Sept. 1989) 
(App. 1). 
54 ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, OAU RESOLUTION CM/RES. 1225(L), July 21, 1989. 
55 EEC to Revise Notification Scheme for Transboundary Shipments of Waste, 12 INT'L 
ENV'T REP. 531 (Nov. 8, 1989)(Revision of Council Directives 84/6311EEC (intra-Community 
shipments) and 86/279/EEC (exports from the Community), announced on October 4, 1989). 
On the previous regime see Kelly, International Regulation of Transfrontier Hazardous Waste 
Shipments: A New EEC Environmental Directive, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 977-96 (1985). The 
European Economic Community (EEC) also has agreed to ban all hazardous and radioactive 
waste exports to the 69 developing countries participating in the ACP-EEC Convention signed 
on December 15, 1989. See Cova, Lome N: une convention pour 10 ans, 333 REVUE DU 
MARCHE COMMUN 1-2 (1990). 
56 SELECTED MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT, UNEP 
REFERENCE SERIES No.3, at 214 (A.C. Kiss ed. 1983); Amendment Protocol of October 25, 
1983, 5 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: MULTILATERAL TREATIES 968:69/A/1, (W. 
Burhenne ed. 1985). 
57 Council Directive 73/404/EEC of November 22, 1973, on the Approximation of the Laws 
of the Member States Relating to Detergents, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 347) 51 (1973) 
(amended by Directive 86/94/EEC). 
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A number of environmental agreements expressly confirm the 
right of parties to take more stringent measures individually or 
collectively. Examples are the 1973 Endangered Species Convention, 
the 1985 OZone Layer Convention, and its 1987 Montreal Protocol. 
Under "framework" conventions, this right is frequently exercised 
in optional additional protocols concluded between some parties only. 
Within the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary 
Air Pollution,58 a ten-member "club" of countries first moved ahead 
in 1984 by declaring a voluntary thirty percent reduction of sulphur 
emissions59-a commitment not all of the thirty-one parties to the 
convention were prepared to share at that time. When the thirty 
percent reduction was formally adopted as a Protocol to the Con-
vention at Helsinki in 1985, twenty-one states signed it.60 During 
the negotiation of a further Protocol on nitrogen oxides in 1987, a 
club of five like-minded states again pressed for a thirty percent 
reduction target;61 and, even though the target did not become part 
of the Protocol finally signed at Sofia in 1988,62 twelve of the Pro-
tocol's twenty-five signatories eventually agreed to commit them-
selves to a voluntary thirty percent reduction. 63 
58 Nov. 13, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Geneva Convention on Air Pollution]. See 
E. CHOSSUDOVSKY, "EAST-WEST" DIPLOMACY FOR ENVIRONMENT IN THE UNITED NA-
TIONS, U.N. Doc. E.88/XV/ST26 (1989) (United Nations Institute for Training and Research 
(UNITAR) study); G. WETSTONE & A. ROSENCRANZ, ACID RAIN IN EUROPE AND NORTH 
AMERICA: NATIONAL RESPONSES TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM (1983); Fraenkel, The 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution: Meeting the Challenge of Inter-
national Cooperation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447 (1989); Sand, supra note 33. 
59 Contained in a declaration adopted by the International Conference of Ministers on Acid 
Rain, Ottawa, March 21, 1984. 57 NETHERLANDS TRACTATENBLAD (1984); governmental 
statements made at the Multilateral Conference on the Environment, Munich, June 27, 1984. 
See J. MCCORMICK, ACID EARTH: THE GLOBAL THREAT OF ACID POLLUTION 79-83 (2d ed. 
1989); Giindling, Multilateral Cooperation of States Under the ECE Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution, in TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION: INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE COOPERATION OF STATES 19 (C. Flinterman, B. Kwiatkowska & J. 
Lammers ed. 1986). 
60 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the 
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30%, Jan. 28, 
1988,27 I.L.M. 707; see also Vygen, Air Pollution Control: Success of East-West Cooperation, 
15 ENVTL. POL'y & L. 6-8 (1985); Bjorkbom, Resolution of Environmental Problems: The 
Use of Diplomacy, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 123 (J.E. Carroll ed. 
1988). 
61 NOTE ON DRAFT ARTICLE 2, WORKING GROUP ON NITROGEN OXIDES, REPORT OF THE 
SIXTH SESSION 3, U.N. Doc. EB.AIRIWG.3/12, Annex I (1987), reprinted in 17 ENVTL. POL'y 
& L. 259 (1987); see Lammers, supra note 33, at 6; Mott, Nitrogen Oxides, 18 ENVTL. POL'y 
& L. 52-53 (1988); Mott, An Acid Rain Summons from Europe, 5 ENVTL. F. No.1, at 32-
33 (1988). 
62 Nitrogen Oxides Protocol, supra note 33; see also Fraenkel, supra note 58, at 472-75. 
63 Contained in a Declaration on the 30% Reduction of Nitrogen Oxide Emissions, October 
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In each of these cases, the initiative taken by a "club within the 
club" played a pilot role in overall target-setting. It also had a 
bandwagon effect, with other parties climbing aboard as it gathered 
political momentum. 
By calling for states to reduce sulphur emission by at least thirty 
percent, the 1985 Helsinki Protocol had introduced an "upwardly 
mobile" dynamic target. Because national reduction achievements 
and pledges are recorded annually, compared internationally, and 
widely publicized, any over-achievement pays political dividends in 
terms of public attention and recognition. 64 As of 1988, twelve of the 
parties to the Helsinki Protocol thus reported that they had already 
reached the thirty percent target ahead of schedule, and ten parties 
announced that they would go on to reduce emissions by more than 
fifty percent (see Figure 4 and Table 1).65 
A similar trend can be documented for the Montreal Protocol on 
ozone-depleting substances. While the 1987 meeting had, after much 
bargaining, settled for CFC reductions of only fifty percent until 
1999,66 the London Conference pledge by the twelve-member Eu-
ropean Community in March 1989 to eighty-five percent as soon as 
possible and 100 percent by the year 200067 led eventually to the 
Helsinki Declaration in May 1989-with eighty-two countries calling 
for a complete CFC phase-out by the end of the century.68 This 
upward revision of the original bottomline was motivated partly by 
new scientific evidence ofthe "ozone hole,"69 but media coverage and 
the worldwide publicity given to individual or collective pledges of 
over-achievement also proved influential. 
31, 1988, reprinted in 18 ENVTL. POL'y & L. 234 (1988) [hereinafter Nitrogen Oxide Emis-
sions]; see Sand, supra note 33, at 255. 
64 See the country-by-country tables of over-achievement pledges in 15 AMBIO 48 (1986) 
and in 8 ACID MAGAZINE 5-6 (1989). 
65 UN ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, THE STATE OF TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POL-
LUTION, AIR POLLUTION STUDIES No.5, at 14, U.N. Sales No. E.89.ILE.25 (1989) [herein-
after TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION]. For a table of actual emission reductions between 
1980 and 1986 (16.4 percent for Europe as a whole), see Iversen, Some Recent Developments 
at the Meteorological Synthesizing Centre West (MS-W) of EMEP, 3 MONITAIR 4 (1989). 
66 Montreal Protocol, supra note 18, art. 2, para. 4, at 1552; see Lammers, supra note 33, 
at 8-14. 
67 Commission of the European Communities, WEEK IN EUR., Mar. 9,1989, at WE/9/89. 
More recently, the EEC Commission has proposed to accelerate the schedule further, so as 
to phase out production of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by 1997 and of halons by 1998. See 
EUR. ENV'T, No. 335, Jan. 31, 1990, at 5. 
66 Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.lI 
5, Appendix I, reprinted in 28 LL.M. 1335 (1989) [hereinafter Helsinki Declaration on Ozone]. 
69 See G. LEAN, supra note 18, at 8-10. 
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Figure 4. Trends in Total Man-Made Emissions of Sulfur Dioxide in Europe and North America, 
1980-1990 (Million Metric Tons of Sulfur Dioxide Per Year). 
1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990 
Source: Sand, note 32, p. 256 
Legally, there is ample room for stricter national rules on bona 
fide environmental grounds-provided they are non-discrimina-
tory-under article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)1° and under the 1979 Tokyo Round's Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade.71 The 1988 United States-Canadian 
70 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 61 Stat. A3, 
A60, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194,262. 
71 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 
art. 2.2, 31 U.S. T. 405, T.I.A.S. No. 9616, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1079, 1083 (1979) (GATT 
Standards Code in force since Jan. 1, 1980). 
Where technical regulations or standards are required and relevant international 
standards exist or their completion is imminent, Parties shall use them, or the 
relevant parts of them, as a basis for the technical regulations or standards except 
where, as duly explained upon request, such international standards or relevant parts 
are inappropriate for the Parties concerned, for inter alia such reasons as national 
security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection for human 
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Table 1. Committed Sulphur Emission Reductions (in % of 1980 levels). 
ECE EEC3 
19931 19952 20002 1993 1998 2003 
Austria -30 -69 
Belgium -30 -48 -40 -60 -70 
Bulgaria -30 
Canada -30 -364 -33 
Czechoslovakia -30 -31 
Denmark -30 -57 -60 -34 -56 -67 
Finland -30 -52 -59 
France -30 -57 -40 -40 -60 -70 
German Dem. Rep. -30 
Germany, Fed. Rep. -30 -69 -40 -60 -70 
Greece +6 +6 +6 
Hungary -30 
Ireland +15 +25 +25 +25 
Italy -30 -27 -39 -63 
Luxembourg -30 -42 -40 -50 -60 
Netherlands -30 -62 -77 -40 -60 -70 
Norway -30 -51 
Poland -29 
Portugal +102 +135 +79 
Spain -6 0 -24 -27 
Sweden -30 -69 -80 
Switzerland -30 -54 -51 
USSR -305 
United Kingdom -41 -20 -40 -60 
Yugoslavia -306 
1. Helsinki Protocol (all emission sources) 
2. Declared over-achievements (all emission sources) 
3. Directive on large combustion sources 
4. Including -50 for 7 Eastern provices 
5. European part, including -30 for Byelorussian and Ukrainian republics 
6. Slovenian republic only 
Free Trade Agreement similarly recognizes environmental restric-
tions as "legitimate domestic objectives."72 
[d. 
In regional integration regimes, however, difficulties can arise. In 
health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment; fundamental 
climatic or geographical factors; fundamental technological problems. 
72 Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, United States-Canada, art. 601, 27 
l.L.M. 281, 316 (1988); see also id. at 352 (cross-reference to art. XX of GATT). 
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the EEC, for instance, there have been protracted quarrels over 
stricter national standards regarding fuel quality and engine emis-
sions, and over national subsidies for the purchase of "clean cars. "73 
Although article 130T of the EEC Treaty74 as revised by the 1986 
Single European Act75 expressly authorizes more stringent national 
measures for environmental protection "compatible with this 
treaty,"76 and article lOOA(4) enables Member States to deviate from 
agreed-upon harmonization measures for environmental reasons,77 a 
country planning to do so must first notify the EEC Commission 
(which may object in case of non-compatibility) so as to avoid arbi-
trary restraints of trade. 78 In the end, it is the trade regime that 
determines, if not the bottomline, at least the margin of tolerable 
asymmetries in the EEC's environmental regime. 
B. Fast Tracks: How to Beat the Slowest-Boat Rule 
Possibly the most serious drawback of the treaty method is the 
time lag between the drafting, adoption, and entry into force of 
standards. Besides the period of negotiation-which in the case of 
the Law of the Sea took fourteen years,79 and in the case of the 
Ozone Layer Convention more than three years-a treaty, once 
signed, must undergo a lengthy process of national ratification by 
the required minimum number of countries before it can become 
effective. 
A 1971 study by the United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research (UNITAR) showed80 that there are definite patterns of 
73 In this context, the EEC Commission has initiated infringement proceedings under article 
169 of the Treaty against Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, and the 
Netherlands. On the dispute with Denmark see Lomas, supra note 35, at 531; on the disputes 
over car emission standards see Hailbronner, Der "nationale Alleingang" im Gemeinschafts-
recht am Beispiel der Abgasstandards fur PKW, 16 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTS-ZEIT-
SCHRIFT 101-22 (1989). 
74 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 
11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
76 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 169) 1 (1987), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 506 (1986) [hereinafter 
SEA]. For a discussion on the SEA, see Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Con-
stitutionfor the Community?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1989). 
76 SEA, supra note 75, art. 130T. 
77 EEC Treaty, supra note 74, art. 100A, para. 4, added by SEA, supra note 75, art. 18. 
76 Bermann, supra note 75, at 543-45 (citing EEC Treaty, supra note 74, art. 100A, para. 
4, added by SEA, supra note 75, art. 18). See Scheuing, UmweltBchutz auf der GrundlO1le 
der Einheitlichen Europaischen Akte, 24 EUROPARECHT 152, 152-92 (1989). 
79 See McDorman, Reservations and the Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 481, 
481-82 (1982). 
80 See UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH, TOWARD WIDER 
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drag in treaty acceptance. Typically, multilateral treaties do not 
become effective until two to twelve years after formal agreement 
has been reached; the average "tempo of acceptance" for multilateral 
treaties, according to UNITAR, is about five years. While some-
like the Law of the Sea Convention (which needs sixty ratifica-
tions)-still have not entered into force eight years after signature, 
most environmental treaties seem to be doing better. The Mediter-
ranean Convention and the Ozone Layer Convention, for instance, 
took less than two years. 
Considering the need for rapid action on most environmental prob-
lems, even two years may be too long. The chlorofiuocarbon (CFC) 
reduction rates agreed under the Montreal Protocol in September 
1987 were already obsolete by the time the Protocol entered into 
force and had to be revised by recourse to a "fast-track" procedure 
not foreseen in the treaty-the Helsinki Declaration on the Protec-
tion of the Ozone Layer, adopted in May 1989.81 
The traditional ratification process and its notorious delays can, 
however, be bypassed in a number of ways. Among the bypass 
devices used in international environmental practi<;e are provisional 
treaty application, various "soft-law" options, and delegated law-
making. 
1. Provisional Treaty Application 
Pending the formal entry into force of an international agreement, 
states may agree to bring it into operation on an interim basis. 
Provisional application is a recognized procedure under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties;82 a classical example is GATT, 
which never legally came into force but has operated for more than 
forty years on the basis of a "protocol of provisional application."83 
ACCEPTANCE OF UN TREATIES 34-40 (1971). See also Churchill, Why Do Marine Pollution 
Conventions Take So Long to Enter into Force?, 4 MAR. POL'y & MGMT. 41, 41-49 (1976). 
81 Helsinki Declaration on Ozone, supra note 68. According to article 9(5) of the Vienna 
Convention, any textual amendment of the Montreal Protocol must be ratified by at least two-
thirds of the Parties (i. e., currently 37 out of 55) to become legally binding. Vienna Convention 
on Ozone, supra note 30, art. 9, para. 4; see Montreal Protocol, supra note 18. It likely will 
take two years following the June 1990 amendment conference in London for the required 
number of parties to ratify the amendment. By contrast, had the reduction rates been lain 
down in an annex to the Protocol, their amendment would become effective six months after 
communication to the Parties. Vienna Convention on Ozone, supra note 30, art. 10, para. 2(c). 
82 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened Jor signature May 23, 1969, art. 25, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331,338. "A treaty or part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry 
into force if (a) the treaty itself so provides; or (b) the negotiating states have in some other 
manner so agreed." Id. 
83 Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 
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In the environmental field, the signatories to the 1979 Geneva 
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution84 also de-
cided-by separate resolution-to "initiate, as soon as possible and 
on an interim basis, the provisional implementation of the conven-
tion" and to "carry out the obligations arising from the convention 
to the maximum extent possible pending its entry into force. "85 As 
a result, the executive body established by the Convention took up 
its functions initially as "Interim Executive Body," holding regular 
annual meetings, creating subsidiary working groups, and the like, 
well before the Convention took force in 1983.86 
When adopting the first Protocol under the Convention in 1984 
(on long-term financing of the European Monitoring and Evaluation 
Program (EMEP»,87 the signatories again decided by resolution-
pending the entry into force of the Protocol-"to contribute to fi-
nancing of EMEP on a voluntary basis, in an amount equal to the 
mandatory contributions expected from them under the provisions 
of the Protocol if all signatories had become parties."88 Even though 
not all signatories complied, voluntary interim funding along these 
lines generated over $3.4 million, enabling the EMEP program to 
operate effectively89 until 1988, when the Protocol entered into force 
and contributions became mandatory. 
The final act of the 1989 Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes90 
took a similar, albeit more timid approach, with its resolution that 
30,1947,61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 308. SeeJ. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE 
AND THE LAW OF GATT § 3.2 (1969); Hansen & Vermulst, The GATT Protocol of Provisional 
Application: A Dying Grandfather?, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263 (1989); Roessler, The 
Provisional Application of the GATT, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 289 (1985). 
84 Geneva Convention on Air Pollution, supra note 58. 
85 Economic Commission for Europe, Resolution on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/HLM.1I2, vol. I, Annex II (1980) (report of the high-level 
meeting within the framework of the ECE on the protection of the environment). 
86 See CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 58, at 122-41. 
87 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Pollution, on Financing 
the Monitoring and Evaluation of Air Pollutants in Europe, Sept. 28, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 484 
(1985). 
88 UN Economic Commission for Europe, Resolution on Long-Term Financing of the Co-
operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of 
Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) , U.N. Doc. E/ECE/EB.AIR/4, Annex III (1984) (Exec-
utive Body for the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, report of the 
second session). 
89 See Dovland, Monitoring European Transboundary Air Pollution, ENV'T, Dec. 1987, 
at 10-15, 27-28; Iversen, supra note 65; The Third Phase of EMEP: 1984-1986, in TRANS-
BOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION, supra note 65, at 19~8; UN Economic Commission for Europe, 
EMEP: The Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range 
Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe, 34 ECON. BULL. EUR. 29 (1982). 
00 Basel Convention, supra note 31. 
1991] GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 239 
"until such time as the convention comes into force and appropriate 
criteria are determined, all states refrain from activities which are 
inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of the Convention,"91 
and with other resolutions to establish preparatory technical working 
groups and an interim Secretariat with voluntary funding. This, too, 
may be considered a provisional application, born of the signatories' 
determination to avoid a potential "anarchic hiatus" created by rat-
ification delays. 
2. Soft Law Options 
Alternatively, states may decide to forgo treatymaking altogether 
and to recommend, by joint declaration, common rules of conduct-
usually referred to as "soft law" to distinguish them from the "hard 
law" of formal legal agreements. 92 Environmental diplomacy has 
produced a wide variety of such declaratory instruments and reso-
lutions. Their recognized practical advantage is that since they are 
not subject to national ratification, they can take instant effect. Their 
inherent risk, however, is precisely that lack of formality that makes 
them attractive as a shortcut. To illustrate the quandary, no sooner 
had the 1988 Declaration on the 30 Percent Reduction of Nitrogen 
Oxide Emissions93 been signed at Sofia on behalf of the Federal 
Republic of Germany by its Minister for the Environment, than the 
State Secretary for Economic Affairs publicly questioned the legal 
force of the declaration. 94 
One of the most prolific makers of soft law has been the UNEP 
Governing Council. Since 1978, the UNEP has addressed a whole 
series of "environmental law guidelines and principles" to states,95 
drafted in typical treaty language except for the copious use of 
"should" in place of "shall." Once adopted by ad hoc groups of experts 
nominated by governments, these provisions normally are approved 
91 Id., Res. 4, adopted Mar. 22, 1989. "Responsibility of States for the Implementation of 
the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal." Id. 
92 See Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 
38 INT'L. & COMPo L. Q. 850 (1989). For application of the concept to the environment, see A. 
KIss, SURVEY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 23 
(International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (lUCN), Environ-
mental Policy and Law Paper No. 10 (1976». 
99 Nitrogen Oxide Emissions, supra note 63. 
94 DER SPIEGEL, Jan. 30, 1989, at 94. 
95 P. Sand, Environmental Law in the United Nations Environment Programme, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 51, 56-60 (R.J. Dupuy ed. 
1985). 
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by the UNEP Governing Council for submission to the UN General 
Assembly, which either incorporates them in a resolution (as in the 
case of the 1982 World Charter for Nature)96 or, less solemnly, 
recommends them to states for use in the formulation of international 
agreements or national legislation (as in the case of the 1982 Conclu-
sions of the Study of Legal Aspects Concerning the Environment 
Related to Offshore Mining and Drilling Within the Limits of N a-
tional Jurisdiction).97 In a number of cases, however, promulgation 
did not go beyond the level of a UNEP Governing Council decision 
(e.g., the 1980 Provisions for Co-operation Between States on 
Weather Modification). 98 
Soft law may be "hardened" by later international practice. When 
the government of Uganda, under gentle World Bank pressure, had 
to consult other Nile Basin countries on a proposed water use project 
for Lake Victoria in December 1983, it did so by way of reference 
to, among other documents, the 1978 UNEP Principles of Conduct 
in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the 
Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources 
Shared by Two or More States. 99 Three months later, the govern-
ments of Egypt and Sudan in their replies in turn referred to the 
guidelines as "jointly honored principles of cooperation," thereby 
quietly promoting them to the status of common regional stan-
dards. loo 
UNEP soft law instruments have also served as forerunners of 
treaty law (as in the case of the 1985/1987 Cairo Guidelines and 
Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazard-
ous Wastes,lOl which led up to the 1989 Basel Convention)102 and as 
96 G.A. Res. 37/7 (1982). See W. BURHENNE & W. IRWIN, THE WORLD CHARTER FOR 
NATURE: A BACKGROUND PAPER (1983); Wood, The United Nations World Charter for 
Nature: The Developing Nations' Initiative to Establish Protections for the Environment, 12 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 977 (1985). 
97 G.A. Res. 37/217 (1982). For text of the conclusions, see P. SAND, supra note 46, at 226. 
98 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/8171A (1980) . 
.. U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/6/14 (1978). See J. BARBERIS, Los RECURSOS NATURALES COM-
PARTIDOS ENTRE ESTADOS Y EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 147 (1979); Adede, United Na-
tions Efforts Toward the Development of an Environmental Code of Conduct for States 
Concerning Harmonious Utilization of Shared Natural Resources, 43 ALB. L. REV. 488 
(1979); Riphagen, The International Concernfor the Environment as Expressed in the Concept 
of the 'Common Heritage of Mankind' and of 'Shared Natural Resources' (lUCN Environ-
mental Policy and Law Paper No. 15), in TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 343 
(M. Bothe ed. 1980). 
100 See U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/13/9/Add.l, at 7 (1984) (progress report to the UNEP Gov-
erning Council). 
101 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/I4130 (1987). 
102 Basel Convention, supra note 31. 
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mandate for new mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation (as 
in the case of the 1984 Provisional Notification Scheme for Banned 
and Severely Restricted Chemicals).103 Environmental recommen-
dations by other international organizations have played a similar 
role, especially those of the OECD. 
Even soft law declarations by non-governmental expert groups 
may attain reference status, with or without intergovernmental 
blessing. The International Law Association's 1966 "Helsinki Rules" 
on the uses of the waters of international riversl04 did just that. A 
more recent example is the set of Proposed Legal Principles for 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development appended 
to the 1987 Brundtland Report to the UN General Assembly.l05 
Others are the guidelines for drinking-water qualityl06 and ambient 
air qualityl07 published under the auspices of the World Health Or-
ganization; though drafted by ad hoc expert groups and never inter-
governmentally adopted, they became a reference source for national 
standard-setting and a yardstick for comparative evaluation of en-
vironmental quality,l08 largely by virtue of the organization's pres-
tige. Similarly, a number of worldwide technical standards for mea-
suring environmental parameters are lain down and updated by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). This organi-
zation ranks as "non-governmental"--even though more than sev-
enty percent of its members are national public standards authori-
ties-and its system of voting by correspondence is not subject to 
any diplomatic clearance or ratification. 109 
103 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/12/14 (1984); see also infra text accompanying note 210. 
104 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTy-SECOND CONFERENCE IN 
HELSINKI, 1966, at 484 (1967). 
105 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 3. See also EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1986). 
106 See 1-3 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR DRINKING-WATER QUALITY 
(1984-1985); see SETTING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR DECISION-MAKING 
10, Annex 6 (H. de Koning ed. 1987). 
107 E.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, AIR QUALITY GUIDELINES FOR EUROPE, RE-
GIONAL PUBLICATIONS: EUROPEAN SERIES No. 23 (1987); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
OXIDES OF NITROGEN, PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDANTS, SULPHUR OXIDES AND SUSPENDED PAR-
TICULATE MATTER, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA DOCUMENTS 4, 7, 8 (1977-1979). 
108 For WHO air quality standards, see H. FRENCH, CLEARING THE AIR: A GLOBAL 
AGENDA 9-16 (Worldwatch Paper No. 94) (1990); UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PRO-
GRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL DATA REPORT 1989-90, at 13 (1989); WORLD RESOURCES INSTI-
TUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1988-89, at 333, 345 (1988). 
109 Uniform standards are prepared by technical expert committees (e.g., for ambient air 
quality measurement by ISO Technical Committee 146), circulated to all member bodies for 
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3. Delegated Lawmaking 
Another way of bypassing ratification is to delegate the powers to 
adopt and regularly amend "technical standards" to a specialized 
intergovernmental body. This technique was gradually developed 
and refined by several global and regional organizations that had to 
cope with frequent technological change: the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU),l1O the Universal Postal Union (UPU),111 
and a number of European conventions on rail and road transport112 
each placed their international standards in separate "technical an-
nexes" or "regulations" that are periodically revised in intergovern-
mental meetings without having to be ratified. Among the most 
advanced and smoothly functioning regulatory regimes so developed 
are the "international health regulations" of the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO),113 the "standard meteorological practices and pro-
cedures" of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO),114 the 
standards for facilitating international maritime traffic, enacted by 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO),115 and the interna-
voting by correspondence, and, if 75% of the votes cast are in favor, published by the ISO 
Council as accepted international standards. See INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COM-
MISSION & INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, DIRECTIVES: PROCE-
DURES FOR THE TECHNICAL WORK 14-23 (Part 1, 1989); L. VERMAN, STANDARDIZATION: A 
NEW DISCIPLINE (1973). 
110 International Telegraphic Convention, art. 13, signed at St. Petersburg 1875, reprinted 
in 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (Supp. 1913). The method of "technical" adjustments proved so 
effective that the Convention did not require diplomatic revision until 1932, when it was 
combined with the Radiotelegraphic Convention into the present International Telecommun-
ication Union (ITU) Convention. See G. CODDING, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICA-
TION UNION: AN EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 28 (1952); E. YEMIN, 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES 63-84 (1969). 
111 Treaty Concerning the Formation of a General Postal Union, art. XIII, signed at Bern 
1874. See G. CODDING, THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION 107 (1964); E. YEMIN, supra note 
110, at 85-113. 
112 For example, article 60(2) of the 1924 Bern Conventions Concerning the Transport of 
Goods by Rail (CIM), 77 L.N.T.S. 367, and the Transport of Passengers and Luggage by Rail 
(CIV), Oct. 23, 1924, 78 L.N.T.S. 17, and article 14(3) of the 1957 UN/ECE European 
Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), 
opened/or signature Sept. 30, 1957,619 U.N.T.S. 79 (technical annexes as amended through 
1990, U.N. Sales No. E.89.VIII.2). 
113 CONSTITUTION OF WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, opened/or signature July 22, 1946, 
art. XXI, 61 Stat.(3) 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14 U.N.T.S. 185. See D. LEIVE, 1 INTERNA-
TIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES: CASE STUDIES IN HEALTH, METEOROLOGY, AND FOOD 3-
152 (1976); YEMIN, supra note 110, at 181-205; Jacobini, The New International Sanitary 
Regulations, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 727-28 (1952). 
114 CONSTITUTION OF WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION art. 7(d), 10(b), 1947, 77 
U.N.T.S. 143. See I. DETTER, LAW MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 228-34 
(1965); LEIVE, supra note 113, at 232-326; YEMIN, supra note 110, at 161-80. 
115 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, art. 7, Apr. 9, 1965, 591 
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tional food standards of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, a joint 
technical body of WHO and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO).116 
The efficacy of "ecostandards"117 in expediting transnational deci-
sionmaking is now widely recognized. 118 Simplified (unratified) 
amendments of standards contained in technical annexes (as distinct 
from formal amendments of the main treaty provisions) are used in 
a wide range of global regimes for environmental standard-setting, 119 
as well as in several regional agreements, including those for pro-
tecting the Baltic and the Mediterranean marine environment. 120 
U.N.T.S. 265. See Alexandrowicz, The Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime 
Traffic and International Technical Regulal:ion: A Comparative Study, 15 INT'L & COMPo 
L.Q. 621-38 (1966). On the influence of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
practice, infra notes 125-32, see C. ALEXANDROWICZ, THE LAW-MAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE 
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1973); Erler, Regulatory Procedures of 
ICAO as a Model for IMCO, 10 MCGILL 1..J. 262-68 (1964). On efforts to cope with the 
problem of ratification delays in subsequent International Maritime Organization (IMO) con-
ventions on marine pollution, infra note 147, see Sielen & McManus, IMCO and the Politics 
of Ship Pollution, in D. KAy & H. JACOBSEN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTER-
NATIONAL DIMENSION 140-83, 152-53, 172-74 (1983). 
116 See 2 LEIVE, supra note 113, at 375-541; Dobbert, Decisions of International Organi-
zations-Effectiveness in Member States: Some Aspects of the Law and Practice of FAO, in 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL Dl~CISIONS 206, at 238-56 (S. Schwebel ed. 1971). 
117 Contini & Sand, Methods to Expedite Environment Protection: International Ecostan-
dards, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 37-59 (1972) (originally submitted as a preparatory document for 
the UN Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.48IPC.II1CRP.3 (1971)); 
Sand, The Creation of Transnational Rule,: for Environmental Protection, in TRENDS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW, IUCNENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW PAPER No. 
15, at 311-20 (M. Bothe ed. 1980). 
118 See, e.g., Abdelhady, Necessite d'etablir des normes uniformes relatives a l'environne-
ment, 41 R. EGYPTIENNE D. INT'L 1-28 (1985); Bothe, The Trends in Both National and 
International Politics for Achieving a Un1fication of Standards in Pollution Matters, 2 
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UMWELTPOLITIK 293-312 (1979); Cumberland, The Role of Uniform Stan-
dards in International Environmental Management, in PROBLEMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL Eco-
NOMICS 239-53 (OECD 1972); Dupuy, Le droiit international de l'environnement et la souver-
ainte des etats: bilan et perspective, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT 29, 35-37 (R.J. Dupuy ed. 1985); Vukasovic, Ekoloski standardi i razvoj 
[Ecological Standards and Development], 35 MEDUNARODNI PROBLEMI 47-58 (1983). On re-
gional harmonization of environmental standards in the European Community, see Rehbinder 
& Stewart, Legal Integration in Federal Systems: European Community Environmental 
Law, 33 AM. J. COMPo L. 371 (1985). 
119 Contini & Sand, supra note 117, at 5f; n.117, which includes health standards, supra 
note 113; food quality standards, supra note 116; conservation standards for protected areas, 
supra note 20; conservation standards for marine living resources, supra notes 22-24; radiation 
protection standards under article 3 ofthe Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; and aircraft emission 
standards, infra note 126. 
120 See Convention on the Baltic, art. 24, supra note 43; Convention on the Mediterranean, 
supra note 44, art. 17; Kuwabara, supra note 49. On the mutual influence of these two 
conventions during their drafting stage, see Sand, The Rise of Regional Agreements for 
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Expeditious as it may be, bypassing ratification also means by-
passing traditional parliamentary controls-raising the important 
question whether delegated transnational standard-setting poses a 
"threat to the democratic process. "121 Different environmental re-
gimes have come up with different answers to this question. One 
option is to entrust new control functions to a "supranational" par-
liamentary body such as the independently elected European Parlia-
ment, whose Environment Committee has begun to play an impor-
tant watchdog role in the European Community's lawmaking 
process. 122 The alternative is to require national endorsement-still 
short of full ratification-for agreed-upon international standards, 
either through affirmative acceptance by governments (as in the case 
of the international food standards of the Codex Alimentarius Com-
mission),123 or by providing the possibility for dissenting states to 
"opt out" of a standard or amendment by a specified date (as stipu-
lated, for instance, in the constitutions of the WHO, the WMO, the 
UN conventions on narcotic drugs, and in several international fish-
eries agreements).124 
This opting-out procedure already has been applied in global pol-
lution control. Consider the adoption and amendment of technical 
annexes under the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil 
Aviation. 125 Under articles 37 and 54 of the Convention, worldwide 
Marine Environment Protection, in THE LAW AND THE SEA: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF JEAN 
CARROZ 223 (1987), reprinted in 39 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 499-513 (1988). 
121 Kaiser, Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process, 25 INT'L ORG. 
706 (1971). 
122 In response to a 1983 resolution, the EEC Commission now submits annual reports to 
Parliament on the application of Community law. The sixth report (for the year 1988) was 
published in the 32 O.J. EVR. COMM. (No. C 330) 1 (1989). For a summary of the section on 
environmental law, see 335 EVR. ENV'T 1 (1990). On the increased powers of the European 
Parliament under the 1986 SEA, see Bermann, supra note 75, at 575-83; Lew, The EEC 
Legislative Process: An Evolving Balance, 27 COLVM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 679 (1989); for the 
environmental implications, see Scheuing, supra note 78. 
123 See D. LEIVE, supra note 113, vol. II, at 461-84; Dobbert, supra note 116, at 250-56. 
124 See Contini & Sand, supra note 117, at 49-52. Opting out or "contracting out" has been 
practiced by international organizations for more than a century, and actually goes back to 
the 1874 Bern Treaty establishing the Universal Postal Union. See supra note 111; Codding, 
Contributions of the World Health Organization and the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization to the Development of International Law, 59 PROCEEDINGS AM. SOC'y INT'L L. 147, 
152 (1965). 
125 Dec. 7, 1944,59 Stat. 1516, E.A.S. No. 469, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Civil Aviation 
Convention]. See T. BVERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION 
ORGANIZATION 76-101 (1969). The simplified amendment procedure goes back to the "technical 
regulations" under article 34 ofthe 1919 Paris Convention on the Regulation of Air Navigation, 
Oct. 13, 1919, III Redmond 3768,11 L.N.T.S. 173, which, via article 61 of the 1933 Interna-
tional Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation, Apr. 12, 1933,49 Stat. 3279, T.S. No. 901, 
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standards on aircraft noise and aircraft engine emissions have been 
lain down since 1981126 by the Council of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO). (The Council is elected every three 
years by the 162 Member States represented in the ICAO Assembly; 
its thirty-three members127 must take up full-time residence in Mon-
treal at the organization's headquarters128-not unlike elected rep-
resentatives in a national parliament.) Once adopted in the Council 
by a two-thirds majority vote,129 an annex becomes mandatory-
without ratification-for all states that do not within sixty days 
notify the Council of their intention to apply different national 
rules130 and for all air traffic over the high seas. 131 This flexible "tacit 
consent" procedure, designed specifically to reconcile the divergent 
requirements of developed and developing nations,132 makes it com-
paratively easy to adjust technical standards by majority decision 
without forcing complete uniformity. 
The ICAO method of standard-setting is probably the closest thing 
to global environmental legislation developed so far-"a 'new cate-
gory of international legal rules . . . which, strictly speaking, are 
neither customary nor contractual. "133 All the evidence suggests that 
161 L.N. T.S. 65, in turn became the model for the WHO international health regulations, 
supra note 113. 
126 ICAO, International Standards and Recommended Practices on Environmental Pro-
tection, Civil Aviation Convention, supra note 125, annex 16, vol. II (1981), amended March 
4, 1988 (aircraft engine emissions). Volume I of annex 16 (1971, 2d ed. 1988) deals with aircraft 
noise standards; see Goy, La lutte de l'OAGI contre Ie bruit des aeronefs, 2 ENVTL. POL'y & 
L. 72-76 (1976). For stricter EEC standards, see ECE Council Directive 89/629,32 O.J. EUR. 
COMM. (No. L 363) 27 (1989). 
127 According to a proposal for amendment of article 50(a), introduced at the 27th ICAO 
Assembly in 1989 for submission to an extraordinary assembly in 1990, the number of Council 
members is expected to be increased to 36. 
128 Pursuant to a 1947 decision of the ICAO Assembly. See Mankiewicz, Organisation de 
l'aviation civile internationale, 2 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 643, 650 
(1956). 
129 Civil Aviation Convention, supra note 125, art. 90. 
130 Id. art. 38. 
131 Id. art. 12; see Carroz, International Legislation on Air Navigation Over the High Seas, 
26 J. AIR L. & COM. 158 (1959). 
132 When the membership of the 1919 Paris Convention on the Regulation of Air Navigation, 
supra note 125, was expanded in the 1930s to include a number of developing countries, it 
became apparent that many of these were technologically unable to comply with some advanced 
international aviation standards and consequently had to be given an option to follow their 
own standards, provided due notice was given to this effect. Gradually, this practice developed 
into a flexible system of "notification of national departures" from worldwide standards, 
eventually codified in present article 38 of the 1944 Chicago Convention, which Buergenthal, 
supra note 125, at 221, labels "real genius"; see also Thayer, International Air Transport: A 
Microsystem in Need of New Approaches, 25 INT'L ORG. 875,884 (1971). 
133 Skubiszewski, Enactment of Law by International Organizations, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L 
246 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:213 
~ ('>-f~~"t-
o'OAC\'+ 
INTERNATIONAL OVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
ANNEX 16 
TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL A VIA TION 
VOLUME II 
AIRCRAFT ENGINE EMISSIONS 
FIRST EDITION-1981 
This first edition of Volume II of Annex 16 was adopted by the Council on 30 June 1981 and 
becomes applicable on 18 February 1982. 
(Amendment 1 of 4 March 1988 applicable 17 November 1988) 
CHAPTER 2. TURBO-JET AND TURBOFAN ENGINES INTENDED FOR PROPULSION 
ONLY AT SUBSONIC SPEEDS 
2.3 Gaseous Emissions 
2.3.1 The provisions of 2.3.2 shall apply to 
engines whose rated output is greater 
than 26.7 kN and whose date of 
manufacture is on or after 1 January 
1986. 
Hydrocarbons (HC): 
Carbon monoxide (CO): 
Oxides of nitrogen (NOx): 
Dp The mass of any gaseous pollutant emitted 
during the reference emissions landing and 
take-off cycle 
F 00 Rated output. For engine emissions pur-
poses, the maximum power/thrust available 
for take-off under normal operating condi-
2.3.2. Gaseous emission levels when mea-
sured and computed in accordance 
with the procedures of Appendix 3 
and converted to characteristic levels 
by the procedures of Appendix 6 shall 
not exceed the regulatory levels deter-
mined from the following formulas: 
D,/Foo = 19.6 
D,/Foo = 118 
D,/Foo = 40 + 271"00 
tions at ISA sea level static conditions with-
out the use of water injection as approved by 
the certificating authority. Thrust is 
expressed in kilonewtons. 
".00 Reference pressure ratio-Methods of measuring 
reference pressure ratio are given in Appendix 1. 
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CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL A VIA TION 
CONVENTION RELATIVE A L' AVIATION 
CIVILE INTERNA TIONALE 
CONVENIO SOBRE A VIACION CIVIL INTERNACIONAL 
Article 38 
Departures from international standards and 
procedures 
Any State which finds it impracticable to 
comply in all respects with any such interna-
tional standard or procedure, or to bring its 
own regulations or practices into full accord 
with any international standard or procedure 
after amendment of the latter, or which 
deems it necessary to adopt regulations or 
practices differing in any particular respect 
from those established by an international 
standard, shall give immediate notification to 
the International Civil Aviation Organization 
of the differences between its own practice 
and that established by the international 
standard. In the case of amendments to 
international standards, any State which 
does not make the appropriate amendments 
to its own regulations or practices shall give 
notice to the Council within sixty days of 
the adoption of the amendment to the inter-
national standard, or indicate the action 
which it proposes to take. In any such case, 
the Council shall make immediate notifica-
tion to all other states of the difference 
which exists between one or more features 
of an international standard and the cor-
responding national practice of that State. 
Pursuant to article 38, 
-24 member states notified ICAO of their 
national compliance with the environmental 
protection standards of Annex 161II as 
amended in 1988 
(Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Chile, Cuba, 
Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Kenya, Niger, Peru, 
Portugal, Solomon Islands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Uruguay, Vanuatu) 
-10 member states notified ICAO of 
national differences with regard to Annex 
161II as amended 
(Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Malawi, Netherlands, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, United Kingdom, 
United States of America) 
-128 member states, after expiry of the 
notification period, are presumed to have 
tacitly accepted Annex 161II as amended. 
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this regime copes successfully both with the "bottomline" syndrome 
(by facilitating upward revision) and with the "slowest-boat" syn-
drome (by dispensing with ratification). The net result is, in Derek 
Bowett's words, "[no] dramatic change in the basic rule of interna-
tionallaw that states assume new obligations only with their consent, 
but rather a pattern of procedures for improving the chances of a 
decision of the majority (be it simple or two-thirds) of a 'legislative' 
character securing general consent. "134 
III. INNOVATIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION 
Once international standards have been set, institutions are 
needed to authorize or prohibit activities covered by the standards, 
and to impose sanctions against non-compliance. Unfortunately, most 
international environmental standards come without the necessary 
regulatory or judicial authority to apply them. A number of recent 
initiatives-such as the Declaration of the Hague, signed by repre-
sentatives of twenty-four countries in March 1989135-have called for 
"new institutional authority" to set and implement environmental 
standards. But without radical reforms in world government, trans-
national regimes for environmental governance still have to cope 
with a dual handicap. 
First, in the absence of a supranational regulatory institution, only 
national institutions can license authorized activities (including as-
sessment of their environmental impact). To the extent that these 
institutions apply agreed-upon international standards for this pur-
pose, they may be said to act on behalf of the international com-
munity-by way of "dedoublement fonctionnel," as Georges Scelle 
called it. 136 Yet, the relationship of these national licensing bodies 
with each other is strictly non-hierarchical, requiring far more com-
plex procedures of reciprocity than needed when applying national 
standards. 
Second, there is currently no compulsory jurisdiction for settling 
disputes over most multilateral environmental regimes. In most of 
the global agreements concluded since the 1970s, each party can 
prevent a case from being taken to arbitration or to the International 
L. 198, 273 (1968). See also Skubiszewski, Forms of Participation of International Organi-
zations in the Lawmaking Processes, 18 INT'L ORG. 790 (1964). 
134 D. BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 146 (4th ed. 1982). 
135 Hague Declaration on the Environment, Mar. 11, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1308, 1309. See also 
Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393 
(1989). 
136 G. SCELLE, PRECIS DE DROIT DES GENS 43 (pt. I 1932). 
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Court of Justice in The Hague, since submission of disputes to third-
party adjudication usually requires "common agreement." 
Initially, these veto clauses were inserted at the insistence of the 
USSR and other East European countries that refused to accept 
compulsory third-party adjudication, deeming it an infringement on 
their sovereignty. More recently, in the wake of its rather painful 
court experience in the Nicaragua case,137 the United States became 
the champion of the jurisdiction veto. In a bout of "Hague phobia," 
starting with the 1983 Cartagena Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the 
Wider Caribbean Region,138 the United States State Department 
introduced a new variety of dispute settlement clauses in all UNEP 
conventions that reserve each party's right to block third-party ad-
judication while leaving open an option to waive the veto right upon 
signing the treaty. This United States-inspired veto clause was also 
introduced-against strong resistance from sixteen other Western 
countries favoring more stringent third-party adjudication139-in the 
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 140 
and in the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Conven-
tion).141 
137 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States), 24 I.L.M. 59 (1985). See also United States: Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from 
the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, 24 I.L.M. 246 
(1985); Editorial Comment, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 312 (1985). For a succinct summary, see 
Akehurst, Nicaragua v. United States of America, 27 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 357 (1987). 
138 Mar. 24, 1983, art. 23,22 I.L.M. 221; see also Frazer & Peterson, Protecting Caribbean 
Waters: The Cartagena Convention, 27 OCEANUS 85 (1984); Bundschuh, Transfrontier Pol-
lution-Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the 
Wider Caribbean Region-Agreement Involving Collective Response to Marine Pollution 
Incidents and Long Range Environmental Planning, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 201 (1984). 
139 U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.53/5/Rev.1 (1985) (appended to the Final Act of the Vienna Con-
ference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protection of the Ozone Layer). The first paragraph reads: 
Id. 
The delegations of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
express their regret at the absence from the Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer of any provision for the compulsory settlement of disputes by 
third parties, at the request of one party. Consistently with their traditional support 
for such a procedure, these delegations appeal to all Parties to the Convention to 
make use of the possibility of a declaration under article 11, paragraph 3, of the 
Convention. 
140 See Vienna Convention on Ozone, supra note 30, art. 11, at 1533. This provision also 
applies to the 1987 Montreal Protocol, pursuant to article 14 of the latter. See Montreal 
Protocol, supra note 18, art. 14, at 1559. 
141 See Basel Convention, supra note 31, art. 20, at 675. 
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The first blow to the World Court's potential as a forum for en-
vironmental dispute settlement had already been dealt in 1970 by 
Canada's reservation with regard to the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act142-later reassurances by judges and friends of the 
court notwithstanding. 143 Today, multilateral environmental agree-
ments that can be enforced by compulsory international adjudication 
are the exception rather than the rule. 144 The imposition of sanctions 
for non-compliance thus requires different (non-hierarchic) ap-
proaches, again involving reciprocity. Further complicating matters, 
mutual obligations under multilateral agreements are more difficult 
to individualize than they are in bilateral disputes. 145 Despite these 
complications, environmental regimes have "learned" to use alter-
native methods and institutions to ensure implementation of agreed-
upon standards, as illustrated by the following examples. 
A. Alternatives to Supranational Regulation 
The conspicuous absence of international regulatory institutions 
for environmental governance in no way prevented the proliferation 
of transnational regimes using a variety of regulatory mechanisms: 
environmental permits, environmental impact statements, environ-
mental labels, and so forth. Experience shows that regulatory func-
tions of this kind can very well be left to existing national bureau-
cracies. Usually, no new international bureaucratic superstructure 
is needed, as long as there is a workable measure of compatibility 
142 Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice, Apr. 7, 1970, 9 LL.M. 598. This declaration excluded from the compulsory juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice "disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction 
or rights claimed or exercised by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or 
exploitation of the living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of 
pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of 
Canada." Id. at 599. The declaration was withdrawn on September 10, 1985. Acceptance of 
LC.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction with Regard to Disputes Arising out of Jurisdictional Claims, 
Sept. 10, 1985,24 LL.M. 1729. 
143 See, e.g., Jessup, Do New Problems Need New Courts?, 65 PROC. AM. SOC'y INT'L L. 
261 (1971) (proposal for special environmental chambers of the court); Lachs, Some Reflections 
on the Settlement of International Disputes, 68 PROC. AM. SOC'y INT'L L. 323 (1974); Singh, 
The Environmental Law of War and the Future of Mankind, in THE FUTURE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 419,422 (R. Dupuyed. 1985) (proposing a new 
"world tribunal to enforce proper regulation in environmental matters"). 
144 See Kiss, Le reglement des differends dans les conventions multilaterales relatives a la 
protection de l'environnement, in THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ON THE NEW NATURAL 
RESOURCES 119 (R.J. Dupuy ed. 1983) (statistical survey of dispute settlement clauses in 
multilateral environmental agreements). 
146 See Sachariew, State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty Violations: Identifying the 
'Injured State' and Its Legal Status, 35 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 273 (1988). 
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and mutual recognition of procedures, supported in practice by what 
political scientists describe as "epistemic"146 cooperation between 
specialists across national boundaries. 
1. Mutual Recognition 
Rather than conferring licensing powers on an international body, 
many environmental agreements provide for the reciprocal recog-
nition of licences and permits by competent national authorities. 
The only conditions are that these permits are properly authen-
ticated and that certain agreed-upon standards are observed in 
granting them. Uniform sanitary and vaccination certificates have 
thus been issued over the past forty years by national medical and 
veterinary services under the WHO International Health Regula-
tions,147 just as phytosanitary certificates for exports and re-exports 
have been under the 1951 International Plant Protection Conven-
tion. 148 National maritime and inland water authorities issue "inter-
national oil pollution prevention certificates" for ships pursuant to 
the 1973/1978 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL).149 They also issue waste disposal permits for substances 
listed on the "grey lists" of at least ten global and regional agree-
ments aimed at preventing marine and inland water pollution, start-
ing with the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matter. 150 Under the 1989 
Basel Convention,151 waste-export notifications and authorizations 
will also be issued exclusively by national authorities. 
146 See infra note 220 and sources cited therein. 
147 See supra note 113 and sources cited therein. 
148 Dec. 6, 1951, 150 U.N.T.S. 68. See also Plant Protection Agreement for South East 
Asia and the Pacific Region, Dec. 6, 1951,247 U.N.T.S. 400; Dobbert, supra note 116, at 217-
21. 
149 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, art. 
5, paras. 1-4, 12 I.L.M. 1319, 1322-23, Feb. 16, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546. See generally R. 
M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: TANKERS AT 
SEA (1979); G. TIMAGENIS, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE POLLUTION (1980). For the 
revised model certificate, see INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, REGULATIONS FOR 
THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION BY OIL 119 (1982). 
150 Opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972,26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165,1046 U.N.T.S. 
120, at 141. See Convention on the Baltic, supra note 43; Convention on the Mediterranean, 
supra note 44; Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, Dec. 
3, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 242 (1977); EEC, Directive 76/1,.61,. on Pollution Caused by Certain Dan-
gerous Substances Discharged into the Aquatic Environment of the Community, 19 O.J. EUR. 
COMM. (No. L 129/23) (1976); EEC, Directive 80/68 on the Protection of Groundwater Against 
Pollution Caused by Dangerous Substances, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 20/43) (1980). 
151 See Basel Convention, supra note 31. 
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In the chemical industry, international trade depends largely on 
reciprocal recognition schemes. For example, under the WHO's Cer-
tification Scheme on the Quality of Pharmaceutical Products Moving 
in International Commerce152-introduced in 1975 and now applied 
by 125 countries-the exporting state's health authority is required 
to certify upon request whether the manufacturer has been found 
on inspection to comply with defined standards of practice in the 
manufacture and quality control of drugs. Some countries have gone 
further toward harmonizing their reference procedures. Examples 
include the chemical test guidelines and principles of good laboratory 
practice laid down by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD);l53 the 1970 Convention for the Mutual 
Recognition of Inspections in Respect of the Manufacture of Phar-
maceutical Products,l54 adopted within the framework of the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA) in Geneva but also followed 
by several non-EFTA countries; and the 1979 "sixth amendment" to 
the European Community's Directive on the Approximation of Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Classifica-
tion, Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Substances,l55 also fol-
lowed by a number of countries outside the EEC. The basis of these 
152 W.H.A. Res. 28.65 (1975), 2 World Health Organization 1983, HANDBOOK OF RESOLU-
TIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND EXECUTIVE BOARD 114 (5th 
ed. 1983). See D. KAY, THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS, 
(American Society of International Law: Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 14 1976); 
and D. JAYASURIYA, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 105-
09 (1985). See also Schoepe, InterlULtional Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: A WHO Inter-
national Code of Conduct for the Marketing of Pharmaceuticals?, SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & 
COM. 121, 127 (1984). 
153 Parts of the OECD guidance documents in this field were subsequently transformed 
into regulatory requirements in the European Community. See, e.g., EEC, Council Directive 
881320 on the Inspection and Verification of Good Laboratory Practice (GLP), 31 O.J. EUR. 
COMM. (No. L 145/35) (1988) amended by Directive 90118,33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 11137) 
(1990). 
164 Oct. 8, 1970,956 V.N.T.S. 3. See also EFTA SCHEME FOR THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
OF EVALUATION REPORTS ON PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS (1979) (a voluntary understanding 
to facilitate the registration of foreign pharmaceuticals, signed by Austria, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland). 
155 Directive 7918311EEC, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 259) (1979) (amending for the sixth 
time Directive 6715J,.8IEEC, 10 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) (1967). See Wyman, Control of 
Toxic Substances: The Attempt to Harmonize the Notification Requirements of the U.S. Toxic 
Substances Control Act and the European Community Sixth Amendment, 20 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 417 (1980). For a list of other relevant EEC Directives (on agricultural chemicals, food 
additives and contaminants, consumer products, etc.), see WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
HEALTH ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL SAFETY: LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
FOR THE CONTROL OF CHEMICALS 243-54 (1984); S. JOHNSON & G. CORCELLE, THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1989). 
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regimes invariably remains one of reciprocal acceptance of national 
certification. 156 
Similarly, the 1973 CITESls7 established worldwide trade controls 
based on mandatory permits and certificates covering the export, 
import, and re-export of plant and animal species or products listed 
in the Convention appendices. Yet, these permits are not issued by 
an international institution. Instead, the entire CITES regime relies 
on the mutual recognition and verification of national permits, issued 
by designated authorities in each of the 109 Member States. The 
international Secretariat merely provides coordination and "switch-
board" services. 
The CITES approach has, of course, numerous historical anteced-
ents in international relations-from seaworthiness and airworthi-
ness certificates for ships and aircraft, to the classification and la-
belling of alcoholic beverages. The incentive for governments to 
participate in any such regime (and the primary sanction of the 
regime) is its reciprocity, and the practical economic advantages this 
offers to the participating state, especially where compliance facili-
tates international communications or the export· of certain prod-
uctS. I58 
An example is the licensing of imported cars in Europe under the 
1958 Geneva Agreement Concerning the Adoption of Uniform Con-
ditions of Approval and Reciprocal Recognition of Approval for Mo-
tor Vehicle Equipment and Parts. 1S9 Under this regime, authoriza-
tions for marketing new cars are based on "type-approval" of vehicle 
models, which in turn depends on, among other things, certified 
compliance with uniform technical criteria for engine emissions. 
Even though these emission standards are harmonized internation-
ally and periodically updated by the Inland Transport Committee of 
the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)-again, under a 
166 See generally D. LEIVE, supra note 113, at 575. Leive points out that article 22 of the 
WHO international health regulations, which actually provides for international certification 
upon request, was never applied, and that national certification continues to be more acceptable 
in practice. Id. at 592. 
157 See CITES, supra note 26. 
158 See D. LEIVE, supra note 113, at 574. 
159 Mar. 20,1958,335 U.N.T.S. 211 (as amended and supplemented by technical regulations 
through 1990). See, e.g., id., Reg. 15 ("uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles 
equipped with a positive-ignition engine or with a compression-ignition engine with regard to 
the emission of gaseous pollutants by the engine"); Mar. 20, 1958, 740 U.N.T.S. 364 (to be 
replaced in 1990 by consolidated Regulation No. 83). On the relationship with concurrent EEC 
regulations in this field, see P. ROQUEPLO, PLUIES ACIDES: MENACES POUR L'EuROPE 297-
307 (1988). 
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"simplified" procedure of delegated lawmaking without ratification, 
requiring approval by only two of the twenty-two Member States to 
bring a technical regulation or amendment into force l60-vehicles are 
licensed by designated national agencies, not by an international 
body. A license issued by one agency is officially recognized in all 
other participating countries, which makes the system particularly 
attractive to car manufacturers as a shortcut to foreign markets. 
(Indeed, the Japanese government maintains permanent observer 
status in the ECE Working Party concerned.) At the same time, the 
ECE regional standards so applied are increasingly becoming models 
for national licensing in other countries outside of Europe. 161 De 
facto, therefore, the geographical scope of the regime is expanding 
well beyond the treaty's membership. 
2. Model Diffusion 
Harmonization of environmental standards also may occur infor-
mally as foreign regulatory models are adopted voluntarily. Many 
developing countries today admit imported chemical products with-
out national evaluation if the product was duly licensed in its country 
of origin-thereby relying on the presumed effectiveness of foreign 
controls. On the other hand, several European countries una-
bashedly borrow United States federal or California state standards 
to upgrade their national legislation on automobile emissions. 162 
160 3q5 U.N.T.S at 214. Article 1(5) of the 1958 Agreement provides that, after deposit 
with the UN Secretariat by at least two Contracting Parties and subsequent communication 
by the UN to all parties, a new or amended text "shall enter into force as a Regulation 
annexed to this Agreement for all Contracting Parties which have informed the Secretary-
General of their acceptance of it within three months from the date of the Secretary-General's 
communication." I d. 
161 Canada, Japan, and the United States participate regularly in the UN/ECE Working 
Party on the Construction of Vehicles (WP29), which is in charge of drafting the technical 
regulations and amendments to the 1958 Agreement. Australia also keeps liaison with the 
Working Party and reports on national regulations aligned on the ECE rules. See International 
Harmonization of Motor Vehicle Regulation, U.N. Docs. TRANS/SCIIWP29/R.454, Add.l 
(1987) (comments by Japan and the United States). 
162 See Transboundary Air Pollution, supra note 65 (reports by Austria, Norway, Sweden, 
and Switzerland). In a Declaration on Air Pollution by Motor Vehicles, signed at Stockholm 
on July 5, 1985, the environment ministers of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Liechten-
stein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland agreed to cooperate toward the introduction of 
national engine emission standards following 1983 United States federal standards. The 
"Stockholm Group" has since continued to meet informally at the technical level (with the 
additional participation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands), and played 
a significant role in the negotiation of tighter standards under the 1958 Agreement in the 
ECE Inland Transport Committee. See Sand, Air Pollution in Europe: International Policy 
Responses, ENV'T, Dec. 1987, at 19. 
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AGREEMENT 
255 
CONCERNING THE ADOPTION OF UNIFORM CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL 
AND RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION OF APPROVAL 
FOR MOTOR VEHICLE EQUIPMENT AND PARTS 
done at Geneva on 20 March 1958 
Regulation No. 49* Revision 1 
(entry into force: 14 May 1990) 
UNIFORM PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE APPROVAL OF COMPRESSION IGNITION 
(C.I.) ENGINES AND VEmCLES EQllPPED WITH C.I. ENGINES WITH REGARD TO THE 
EMISSIONS OF GASEOUS POLLUTANTS BY THE ENGINE 
1. SCOPE 
This Regulation applies to the emission of gaseous pollutants from c.1. engines used for 
driving motor vehicles having a design speed exceeding 25 km/h of categories M, having 
a total mass exceeding 3.5 tonnes, M" M3, N" N, and N3 . ** 
5.2 Specifications concerning the emission of pollutants 
The emission of pollutants by the engine submitted for testing shall be measured by the 
method described in annex 4. Other methods may be approved if it is found that they 
yield equivalent results. The emissions of the carbon monoxide, the emissions of the 
hydrocarbons and the emissions of the oxides of nitrogen contained shall not exceed the 
amounts shown in the table below: 
Mass of carbon Mass of hydro- Mass of oxides of 
monoxide (CO) carbons (HC) nitrogen (NO,) 
grammes per kWh grammes per kWh grammes per kWh 
11.2 2.4 14.4 
·UN/ECE Regulation No. 49 on emissions from diesel engines is currently applied in the fol-
lowing countries: Belgium; Czechoslovakia; France; Finland, Germany (East and West); Hungary; 
Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Romania; USSR; United Kingdom; and Yugoslavia. Australia and 
New Zealand apply UN/ECE Regulations No. 49 unilaterally. Pursuant to EEC Directives 
88/76, 88/77 and 88/436, provisions corresponding to Revision 1 of UN/ECE Regulation No. 
49 will become mandatory in all 12 member countries of the European Community in October 
1990. Austria and Switzerland have announced stricter national emission standards for diesel 
engines; whereas Norway and Sweden will align their requirements on 1990 U.S. standards. 
**I.e., diesel-fuelled passenger cars, trucks and buses. 
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The international transfer of innovative norms and institutions, a 
transcultural process described as mimesis by Arnold Toynbee, 163 
follows patterns of geographical diffusion quite similar to the spread 
of technological innovations. l64 Some social geographers have even 
drawn parallels with the spread of contagious diseasesl65-vindicat-
ing a metaphor already used by Goethe, in Faust: 
All rights and laws are still transmitted 
like an eternal sickness of the race, 
from generation unto generation fitted 
and shifted round from place to place. 166 
One legislative innovation that has spread widely is the "environ-
mental impact assessment" (EIA) procedure first introduced by the 
United States' 1969 National Environmental Policy Act. 167 While 
attempts to internationalize the procedure through a treaty-advo-
cated by United States Senator Claiborne Pell since 1978168-were 
manifestly unsuccessful and never progressed beyond a "soft law" 
declaration in the UNEP,169 the underlying concept of the legislation 
rapidly and quite informally became a model for at least thirty 
countries worldwide. EIA now is a commonplace legal term not only 
163 J. TOYNBEE, 12 A STUDY OF HISTORY: RECONSIDERATIONS 343 (1961) ("the reception 
and adoption of elements of culture that have been created elsewhere and have reached the 
recipient by a process of diffusion"). 
164 See E. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (1962); T. HAGERSTRAND, INNOVATION 
DIFFUSION AS A SPATIAL PROCESS (1967). 
165 P. GOULD, SPATIAL DIFFUSION 55-58 (Association of American Geographers: Resource 
Paper No.4) (1969). 
166 J.W. GOETHE, FAUST, pt. I, scene 4, at 79 (B. Taylor trans. 1870) (1932). 
167 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970). For a 
recent critical review of the Act by its principal draftsperson, see Caldwell, A Constitutional 
Law for the Environment: 20 Years with NEPA Indicates the Need, ENV'T, Dec. 1989, at 6, 
7-11, 25-28. 
168 See International Environmental Assessment, S. Res. 49, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); 
Mansfield, Shaping Environmental Assessment for Use in International Activities, in EN-
VIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE 319 (1981). See also Goldie, A General View of Inter-
national Environmental Law: A Survey of Capabilities, Trends and Limits, in THE PROTEC-
TION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTL LAW 25, 124-40 (A.C. Kiss ed. 1975). 
169 UNEP Governing Council Decision 14/25, Goals and Principles of Environmental 
Impact Assessment, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/17/Annex III (1987); see also G.A. Res. 184,42 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) para. 140, U.N. Doc AlRES/42/184 (1987); Bonine, Environmental 
Impact Assessment: Principles Developed, 17 ENVTL. POL'y & L. 5, 6-9 (1987). The UNEP 
Secretariat did, however, promote the use of EIA in multilateral development funding, in 
regional seas agreements, and generally in developing countries. See P. SAND, supra note 46; 
see also Y. AHMAD & G. SAMMY, GUIDELINES TO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1985); J. MAYDA, MANUAL ON ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION 
(UNEP/IALS 1979); UNEP REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: BASIC PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1988). 
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in English-speaking countries from Australia to Zambia,170 but also 
as declaraci6n de efecto ambiental in the 1974 Colombian Code of 
Renewable Natural Resources and Environment Protection,171 as 
evaluaci6n de impacto ambiental in Spain's 1986 Royal Decree on 
EIA,172 as etude d'impact sur l'environnement in the 1976 French 
Nature Conservation Actl73 (followed by similar provisions in other 
French-speaking countries, such as the 1983 Algerian Act on Envi-
ronment Protection),174 as Umweltvertraglichkeitspr1lfung (UVP) in 
the 1990 West German EIA Act175 (based on a 1985 European Com-
munity Directive on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public 
and Private Projects on the Environment),176 and in recent (1988) 
East German legislation. 177 Here again, parallels may be drawn with 
worldwide diffusion of other institutional models-notably, the "TVA 
syndrome" in river basin management. 178 
Another widely diffused model of this kind is the concept of a 
pollution tax or financial charge pro-rated to the volume of pollutant 
emissions. Originally developed (since 1904) as "effluent fees" for 
regional pollution control by water management associations in the 
Ruhr River Basin,179 emission charges have since been introduced 
170 Australia enacted its Environment Protection Act (Impact of Proposals) on Dec. 17, 
1974. Austl. Acts No. 164 (as amended by Austl. Acts No. 12 (1987); Zambia amended its 
1970 Natural Resources Conservation Act in 1981 to introduce impact assessments for major 
water development projects. Zambia Government Gazette, No. 53, suppl. no. 123, at 673. 
171 Decree No. 2811, arts. 27, 28, Dec. 18, 1974, 111 DIARIO OFICIAL (no. 34,243) (1975). 
See Cano, Comprehensive Environmental Legislation: A Summary Review of Colombia's 
Environmental Code, 1 ENVTL. POL'y & L. 177-79 (1976). 
172 Royal Decree No. 1302, June 28, 1986, 155 BOLETIN OFICIAL at 2373 (1986) (translated 
by FAO in 36 FOOD & AGRIC. LEGIS. 173 (1987». 
173 Act No. 76-629, July 10, 1976, 162 JOURNAL OFFICIEL at 4203 (1976) (implemented by 
Decree No. 77-1141, Oct. 12, 1977). 
174 Act No. 83-03, art. 130, Feb. 5, 1983, 6 JOURNAL OFFICIEL at 250 (1983) (translated by 
WHO in 35 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 176 (1984). 
175 Federal Act on Environmental Impact Assessment (UVPG), 1990 BGBl I 205 (W. Ger.); 
see Storm, Legislation on Environmental Impact Assessment in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, U.P.R. L. REV. (forthcoming, 1990). 
176 EEC Council Directive 85/337 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and 
Private Projects on the Environment, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 175) 40 (1985); see Grant, 
Implementation of the European Community Directive on Environmental Impact Assess-
ment, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 463, 464-77 (1989). 
177 Investment Decree of Nov. 30, 1988, art. 4(3), GBI.I No. 26 at 289, Dec. 16, 1988. On 
earlier environmental controls in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) regional 
investment planning, see Sand, The Socialist Response: Environmental Protection Law in 
the German Democratic Republic, 3 ECOLOGY L. Q. 451, 470-71 (1973). 
178 See A. HIRSCHMAN, DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS OBSERVED 21-28 (1967) (referring to the 
fashion of presenting new river valley development schemes in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, 
Iran, or India as true copies of the Tennessee Valley Authority ("pseudo-imitation"». See also 
Dore, The Prestige Factor in International Affairs, 51 INT'L AFF. 190 (1975). 
179 See A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, 
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in many other regions and countries and applied to a wide range of 
other environmental issues. The basic idea is to levy a disincentive 
charge on specified economic activities, depending on how much 
environmental harm they do, and to earmark the proceeds from the 
charge for specific counter-measures. 180 Effluent charges for water 
pollution are now part of national law in Germany and elsewhere in 
Western Europe (the Netherlands, France, Italy)181 as well as in 
Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland).182 They have 
been proposed for adoption in the United States and the USSR.I83 
Landing charges for aircraft noise, pro-rated according to engine 
type or aircraft weight, are levied in Japan and at several West 
European airports. l84 Since March 1989, all domestic air traffic in 
Sweden is subject to a pro-rated charge on aircraft engine emissions 
of nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons. 185 
Surprisingly, emission charges seem to function both in market 
economies and in centrally planned economies. The (East) German 
Democratic Republic first introduced a "dust and gaseous emissions 
fee" on industrial enterprises emitting air pollutants in excess of 
specified levels, starting experimentally in two of the most polluted 
districts in 1969 and extending the system country-wide by legisla-
tion in 1973. 186 Hungary and Poland followed. 187 In 1985, France 
INSTITUTIONS 237--53, 257-62 (1968); R. JOHNSON & G. BROWN, CLEANING UP EUROPE'S 
WATERS: ECONOMICS, MANAGEMENT AND POLICIES 113-32 (1976). 
180 See Sand, Pollution Sanctions: New Alternatives to Civil Liability, 1973 J. Bus. L. 
147--54; F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977). 
181 For a survey of current national practice in OECD Member Countries, see J. OPSCHOOR 
& H. VOS, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1989); see also 
Bongaerts & Kraemer, Permits and Effluent Charges in the Water Pollution Control Policies 
of France, West Germany and the Netherlands, 12 ENVTL. MONITORING & ASSESSMENT 127 
(1989). 
182 See J. SALZWEDEL, STUDIEN ZUR ERHEBUNG VON ABWASSERGEBUEHREN [Studies on 
Effluent Charges for Waste Water] 23-33 (1972); Sand, Environmental and Water Law in 
East Germany: National and International Aspects, in 12 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: INTER-
NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 77-84 (J. Nowak ed. 1976). 
183 For the United States, see Kneese & Bower supra note 179, at 143-64, 315-18; ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, EFFLUENT CHARGES ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION (Mon-
ograph No.1) (1973). New USSR legislation on an environmental fund to be financed from 
emission charges is reported in TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION, supra note 65, at 10. 
184 See J. OPSCHOOR & H. Vos, supm note 181, at 47-49; OECn, POLLUTION CHARGES IN 
PRACTICE 92-97 (1980). 
185 Act on Environmental Tax for Domestic Air Traffic, Dec. 15, 1988, Svensk Forfattnings-
Samling at 1566. 
185 See Sand, supm note 177, at 477-78; Fifth Implementing of the National Environment 
Act (Air Quality Decree) of Feb. 12, 1987, art. 15, GBI.I No.7 (1987). 
187 See UNIECE, NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND POLICIES FOR AIR POLLUTION ABATEMENT, 
16 U.N. Sales No. E.87.II.E.29 (1987). 
1991] GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 259 
enacted a "para-fiscal air pollution tax" on all large fossil fuel com-
bustion sources emitting more than 2500 metric tons of sulphur 
dioxide per year (some 480 plants representing about two-thirds of 
total sulphur emissions in the country), taxed at 130 francs per 
metric ton sulphur dioxide (about two cents per kilogram), with the 
proceeds going to anti-pollution investments in the industries con-
cerned. l88 From 1990 onwards, the French tax will be raised to 150 
francs per ton and extended to industrial emissions of nitrogen oxides 
(NOx ). Finland enacted a whole package of "environmental taxes" 
on fossil fuels as part of its 1990 budget legislation,189 and similar 
measures-including a new charge on carbon dioxide (C02) emissions 
at the rate of twenty-five ore (about four cents) per kilogram COz-
are under discussion in Sweden. 190 This impressive progress aside, 
none of the existing emission charges today are considered steep 
enough to achieve the full "polluter-pays" effect postulated in welfare 
economics. None will, in other words, internalize all social costs 
generated by a pollution source. 191 Rather, their avowed function is 
to raise para-fiscal revenue through environmentally rational pen-
alties. 192 
A more recent example of transnational diffusion is the "environ-
mental label" for consumer products first introduced in the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1978. 193 There, an expert jury under the 
auspices of the Federal Environment Ministry awards to consumer 
products an official environmental quality label, based on the inter-
national logo of the UNEP and popularly known as the "blue angel"l94 
188 Decree No. 85-582, June 7, 1985, J.O. 6403 (1985). 
189 Amendments of the fuel tax (prorated according to carbon content), the oil-spill protec-
tion charge, and the waste-oil charge, adopted on September 22, 1989, are in force from 
January 1 to December 31, 1990. Together with other environmental taxes and charges in the 
1990 budget, they will amount to about 1 billion Finnish marks in revenues, representing 
slightly under one percent of the government's tax accrual. On the other hand, exemptions 
from turnover tax for environmental protection investments for this fiscal year will reduce 
state revenues by an estimated 400--500 million fin-marks. Ministry of the Environment, press 
release 89/uam30711dt/ublbrlIlI (Sept. 9, 1989). 
190 MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY, EKONOMISKA STYRMEDEL I MIWOPOLITI-
KEN: ENERGI OCH TRAFIK [Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy: Energy and 
Traffic] 23-29 (English summary pt. I); see Kessler, Sweden Proposes Charges on Emission 
of Pollutants to Finance Environmentally Sound Technology, 18 AMBIO 462 (1989). For 
criticism of the proposal, see 13 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 7 (Jan. 10, 1990). 
191 See Seigneur, Economic Aspects of International Air Pollution Control Policies, 29 
INT'L J. ENVTL. STUD. 297, 298-99 (1987) (sources cited therein). 
192 J. OPSCHOOR & H. VOS, supra note 181, at 36. 
193 UMWELTBUNDESAMT [Federal Environmental Agency], INFORMATION SHEET ON THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LABEL (1989); J. Staupe, The German Environmental Label (August 30, 
1989) (paper prepared on behalf of the Federal Environmental Agency). 
194 The original Blue Angel was a vaudeville bar in a novel by HEINRICH MANN, PROFESSOR 
UNRAT (1905), and the title of a famous Marlene Dietrich movie (1930). 
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(see Figure 5). Once commercial users pay a license fee to the non-
governmental National Institute for Quality Assurance and Certifi-
cation (RAL), they can use the label in advertising and packaging 
on products ranging from low-emission oil combustion units to "en-
vironmentally benign" (recycled) toilet paper.195 The scheme turned 
Figure 5: Environment Product Labels. 
Blue Angel West Germany, 1978 EcoMark Japan, 1989 
EcoLogo Canada, 1989 Environment Mark Nordic Council, 1989 
Source: Sand, supra note 33, at 256. 
196 Detailed environmental specifications for sixty-odd eligible product groups are adopted 
1991] GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 261 
out to be highly popular and successful-lawsuits by disgruntled 
competitors notwithstanding196-and currently some 3500 products 
on the market bear the blue angel mark. 197 Similar systems of prod-
uct labelling and licensing, partly based on the West German expe-
rience, were introduced in 1989 both in Canada (EcoLogo)198 and in 
Japan (EcoMark).199 In November 1989, the Nordic Council of Min-
isters adopted a joint environmental label for consumer products 
("miljomarkt") to be used in all Scandinavian countries, based on 
national certification following along common guidelines.2°O 
In each of these schemes, the private sector participates through 
representatives of non-governmental industrial, environmental, and 
consumer protection associations. In some, non-governmental insti-
tutions are empowered to do the licensing. In the Federal Republic 
of Germany, most anti-pollution equipment for motor vehicles and 
stationary emission sources is certified under contract by regional 
engineering societies known as TUV (Technische Uberwachungs-
Vereine, or technical inspection associations).201 Similar non-govern-
mental inspection services for 'motor vehicles exist in Belgium and 
Sweden, which (jointly with governmental inspectorates from other 
and periodically updated by the jury. See RAL, UMWELTZEICHEN: PRODUKTANFORDERUNGEN 
(1989). 
196 See the most recent decision rendered by the Federal Court of Justice, VGU Cologne 
Fair Trade Ass'n v. Kaiser's Drugstore AG, 42 NJW 711-14 (Oct. 20, 1988); see also the 
critical review of earlier judgments by Wimmer, Ein Blauer Engel mit Rechtlichen Macken, 
43 BETRIEBS-BERATER 565-71 (1989). 
197 There were 3273 products listed as of December 31, 1989, with an annual increment of 
400 expected for 1990. See Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Radiation Protection, 2 UMWELT 62 (1990) (information bulletin). 
198 Under the Environmental Choice Program, an advisory board established pursuant to 
the 1988 Canadian Environmental Protection Act develops and updates environmental guide-
lines for selected product categories which, after public review, are promulgated in the Canada 
Gazette and publicized in the EcoLogo Environmental Choice Newsletter. As of December 
1989, 14 product category guidelines had been issued. Testing and certification of products is 
carried out under contract by the Canadian Standards Association, which then concludes 
licensing agreements (on an annual fee basis) with individual user companies. 
199 Starting in February 1989, an EcoMark Secretariat established within the Japanese 
Environment Agency began issuing environmental criteria for selected commodities and con-
cluding licensing contracts with users for two-year periods. See 17 JAPAN ENVIRONMENT 
SUMMARY, No.3, at 1-2 (1989). 
200 Nordic Council of Ministers, Guidelines for the Introduction of a Voluntary Nordic 
Environmental Labelling Scheme, 24.10.89/SP. Product selection criteria are to be laid down 
by a coordinating board (with one or two representatives from each Member State) under the 
Council's Administrative Committee for Consumer Matters. Id. 
201 Some legal commentators refer to this practice as "public administration by the private 
sector." U. STEINER, OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG DURCH PRIVATE (1975). The largest of 
the associations, TUV Rhineland (Cologne), is increasingly involved in inspection contracts 
abroad. 
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European countries) participate in the International Motor Vehicle 
Inspection Committee. In Norway, technical and environmental cer-
tification of offshore mining platforms is carried out by a private 
company (Det Norske Veritas), following the century-old practice of 
classifying seaworthy ships, initiated by insurance companies such 
as Lloyd's.202 The Geneva-based Societe Generale de Surveillance 
(SGS), through its various subsidiaries and affiliates in 140 countries, 
also provides inspection services for environmental quality certifi-
cation under commercial contracts. 203 
Wider diffusion of these institutional models is bound to raise 
transnational problems. Already more than ten percent of the cur-
rent environmental product labels in the Federal RepUblic of Ger-
many are held by foreign firms (including fourteen from the N eth-
erlands, eleven from Austria, thirty-three from ten other West 
European countries, plus some Japanese car manufacturers and 
American chemical companies)204-and the trend is rising in antici-
pation of the free-trade regime of the 1992 European Common Mar-
ket. Conversely, West German exports carrying the "blue angel" are 
reportedly gaining new market shares in the United Kingdom and 
other countries with environmentally conscious consumers. 205 To 
avoid unfair trade practices, arrangements for mutual recognition of 
national environmental labels, possibly including harmonized stan-
dards and procedures of product selection and identification, will 
become necessary. For instance, since the West German jury already 
allows the applicant's home state (Lander) authorities to participate 
in the proceedings,206 why not open the procedure to competent 
foreign authorities where applicable? 
3. Alert Diffusion 
Transnational diffusion of regulatory experience is particularly 
important in environmental risk management. Some 70,000 chemi-
202 The company's former ship division was restructured in 1988 as Det Norske Veritas 
Classification A.S. for a range of classification services internationally, including land-based 
wind turbines in Denmark and California. DET NORSKE VERITAS, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 11-
18 (1989). 
203 SGS has been "involved as a privileged partner of the United Nations Environment 
Programme in the preparation of a draft convention dealing with the handling of toxic waste." 
SGS, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1989). The proximity of SGS headquarters was one of the 
points stressed by the Swiss government in favor of locating the new UNEP Secretariat for 
the Basel Convention in Geneva. See Basel Convention, supra note 31. 
204 See J. Staupe, supra note 193, at 15; RAL, supra note 195 (product list). 
205 See Schoon, Germans Fill Green Gap in UK Market, The Independent, June 1, 1989. 
206 Wimmer, supra note 196, at 566-68 (quoting RAL guidelines for license contracts). 
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cals are in common use today, with 500 to 1,000 new compounds 
added every year. While very little is known yet about the toxicity 
of almost two-thirds of these,207 information is available on national 
regulatory action concerning chemicals already considered environ-
mentally harmful or hazardous. Following a 1982 General Assembly 
Resolution,208 the UN Secretariat regularly publishes a "consolidated 
list" of products whose consumption or sale have been banned, with-
drawn, severely restricted, or not approved by governments. The 
fourth edition (1990) lists some 400 chemicals and 300 pharmaceuti-
cals. 
Following regional initiatives by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, and inspired in part by earlier United 
States federal legislation,209 the Governing Council of the UNEP in 
1984 adopted a "provisional notification scheme" for banned or se-
verely restricted chemicals, requiring countries to exchange stan-
dard warnings when exporting any of these products. 21o Further 
elaborated by the 1987 London Guidelines for the Exchange of In-
formation on Chemicals in International Trade,211 the scheme is 
administered by the UNEP's Geneva-based International Register 
of Potentially Toxic Chemicals and currently implemented by sev-
enty-five countries. Related provisions are found in the International 
Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides adopted 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in 
1985.212 (Both the UNEP and the F AO procedure were amended in 
1989 to include the requirement of "prior informed consent," under 
which participating importing countries will have to give their ex-
press approval before hazardous chemicals can be brought in.)213 
207 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE 
NEEDS AND PRIORITIES (1984). 
208 Protection against Products Harmful to Health and the Environment, G.A. Res. 137, 
37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 112-13, U.N. Doc. AlRES/37/137 (1982). 
209 See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 1360(d) 
(1988); Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (1988); see also Gabbay, 
International Ramifications of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
136, 151 n.100 (1979); Goldberg, Efforts to Prevent Misuse of Pesticides Exported to Devel-
oping Countries: Progressing Beyond Regulation and Notification, ECOLOGY L.Q. 1025, 1033-
35 (1985). 
210 See supra note 103. 
211 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/14/27 (1987). 
212 FAO Res. 10/85, FAO Doc. C85/REP (FAO Conference, 23d Sess.); see FAO, INTER-
NATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF PESTICIDES, art. 9 (infor-
mation exchange) (1986). 
213 See also European Community Council Regulation 8811734 on EEC Imports and 
Exports of Certain Dangerous Chemical Products, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 155) (1988). 
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Information diffusion of this kind serves as a danger signal to 
importing countries, especially with regard to the fifty to one 
hundred "red flag" chemicals currently banned by more than ten 
states. While this process may be tantamount to blacklisting, no 
international regulatory action is involved because both the consol-
idated UN list and the UNEP/OECD schemes are based entirely on 
national regulatory decisions in the countries concerned. 214 
A similar notification procedure debuted under article 5 of the 
CITES treaty.215 Besides the Convention's international "black" and 
"grey" lists of endangered species (appendices I and II), there is a 
separate third appendix on which each Member State may list any 
species or taxa whose export it wishes to ban or control for national 
reasons. Unlike the listing of species in appendices I and II, which 
requires international agreement by a two-thirds ~ajority vote, ap-
pendix III listings are made by simple unilateral notification to the 
CITES Secretariat, which in turn communicates it to all other Mem-
ber States with a request to adjust their trade controls accordingly. 
Although originally not accorded much weight, recourse to appendix 
III has increased over the years. By 1989, 249 taxa were listed. 216 
In addition, as practice gradually developed in treaty administration, 
the CITES Secretariat has begun to notify all parties whenever a 
Member State announces a national ban on exports or imports-
over and above the controls required by the treaty-so as to solicit 
international enforcement assistance. 217 While such calls are issued 
voluntarily-and are not always viewed kindly by other parties, in 
view of the extra administrative burden involved218-they rarely go 
unheeded, and they are duly included in the enforcement instructions 
given by most governments to their trade control authorities. Pre-
cautionary diffusion of foreign restrictions thus tends to produce the 
desired result, even though the system is not strictly mandatory. 
214 Huismans, Towards a World Black List of Chemicals?, 6 IRPTC BULLETIN Nos. 2-3 
(1984). 
215 See CITES, supra note 26, art. 5, at 248. 
216 Thirteenth Annual Report of the Secretariat, 7 CITES Doc. 7.7 (1989) [hereinafter 
Thirteenth Annual Report]. A French proposal to restrict unilateral appendix III listings to 
the biennial CITES Conferences was unsuccessful; Resolution 7.15, adopted at the 1989 
Lausanne Conference, merely "encourages" declarations concerning appendix III to be made 
during conference meetings. See 11 TRAFFIC BULL. 25 (1990). 
217 Notifications regarding national legislation ranked second in numbers among the 93 
notifications to parties issued by the CITES Secretariat between January 1988 and June 1989. 
Thirteenth Annual Report, supra note 216, at 26. 
218 The same is true for appendix III listings generally, which frequently provoke formal 
reservations by importing countries unwilling to accept the additional enforcement burden 
involved. 
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4. Epistemic Networks 
A crucial factor for the success of environmental agreements is 
direct permanent contact among the national agencies, groups, and 
individuals entrusted with implementation. Reference is often made 
to the role of "technical elites"219 or "epistemic communities"220 to 
explain consensus-building in the negotiation of international agree-
ments. Experience with environmental regimes suggests that epis-
temes-defined as "a set of shared symbols and references, mutual 
expectations and a mutual predictability of intentions"221-may be 
even more important during implementation. 
A common feature of mutual recognition schemes is their reliance 
on a permanent network of national administrators, designated as 
the official channel for transnational communication and verification. 
CITES222 established a network of "management authorities" and 
"scientific authorities," mostly consisting of wildlife management 
officers and wildlife biologists. The WHO, UNEP, and OECD 
schemes to control trade in chemicals223 (as well as the future Basel 
Convention network for hazardous wastes)224 rely on designated pub-
lic health officials and government chemists. The ECE motor vehicle 
certification system225 works through licensing agencies usually 
staffed by automotive engineers. Monitoring under the Transboun-
dary Air Pollution Convention226 is carried out by the EMEP net-
work of stations and laboratories,227 most of which are part of na-
tional meteorological services. Often, the transnational expert 
communities so established include non-governmental sectors-in-
dustry, research institutions, and competent environmental groups. 
In each case, the common professional background of participants 
tends to foster a distinct "epistemic" solidarity across frontiers-the 
old boys' network. 
219 See Johnston, Marine Pollution Agreements: Successes and Problems, in INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 199-204 (J. Carroll ed. 1988). 
220 See Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends, 29 INT'L 
ORG. 557 (1975); P. Haas, Ozone Alone, No CFCs: Epistemic Communities and the Protection 
of Stratospheric Ozone (paper submitted to the 1988 Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1988); Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic 
Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control, 43 INT'L ORG. 377 (1989). 
221 Ruggie, supra note 220, borrowing a term from M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS 
(1973). 
= See CITES, supra note 26, at 245. 
223 See supra notes 152-53, 210-11 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
226 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
227 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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As a rule, authority for licensing or monitoring decisions of the 
kind described here (whether they concern imported chemicals, cars, 
wildlife products, or meteorological data) is delegated to officials at 
an intermediate technical level. For efficiency's sake, their commu-
nications with each other and with the international Secretariats 
concerned are usually direct, skirting national departmental hierar-
chies and virtually bypassing diplomatic channels. Since transna-
tional contacts enhance the professional status of participants, they 
also create strong incentives for continuing and expanding interna-
tional agreements. Just as mutual confidence and "cognitive 
convergence"228 among specialists develops when treaties are pre-
pared and negotiated, technocratic solidarity among those who mon-
itor compliance feeds back into the national evaluation and into the 
further development of environmental regimes. It also makes cheat-
ing in treaty implementation more difficult and can prevent or at 
least defuse disputes. 
B. Alternatives to Intergovernmental Litigation 
When evaluating the implementation and effectiveness of inter-
national agreements, lawyers tend to focus on judicial or quasi-
judicial enforcement, in particular through the principle of state 
responsibility (now being codified by the UN International Law 
Commission).229 The growing literature on state responsibility for 
environmental harm is usually traced back to the 1941 United States-
Canadian Trail Smelter arbitration.230 In practice, though, intergov-
ernmentallitigation of the Trail Smelter type is rare and plays little 
or no role in the implementation of multilateral treaties and stan-
dards. Indeed, the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution expressly excludes the question of state 
liability for damage. 231 
228 Haas, supra note 6, at 368. 
229 See McCaffrey, The Fortieth Session of the International Law Commission, 83 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 153 (1989); McCaffrey, The Forty-First Session of the International Law Commis-
sion, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 937 (1989); McCaffrey, The Thirty-Eighth Session of the International 
Law Commission, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 668 (1987); McCaffrey, The Thirty-Ninth Session of the 
International Law Commission, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1988); McCaffrey, The Work of the 
International Law Commission Relating to Transfrontier Environmental Harm, 20 N. Y. U. 
J. INT'L L. & POL. 715 (1988). 
230 Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1935). See 
Read, The Trail Smelter DisIYUte, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 213 (1963); M. Whiteman, 6 DIG. 
INT'L L. 253 (U.S. State Dep't 1968). 
231 Geneva Convention on Air Pollution, supra note 58, art. 8(f) n.1, at 1445. "The present 
Convention does not contain a rule on State liability as to damage." Id. 
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For at least two reasons, intergovernmental liability suits do not 
seem to be a promising way of enforcing multilateral environmental 
agreements. First, unlike the bilateral Trail Smelter case, which 
concerned a single point source in Canada causing instant harm to 
identified victims nearby in the United States, today's multilateral 
regimes deal increasingly with the long-range (up to several thou-
sand miles) and long-term (up to several generations) effects of 
multiple pollutants from a variety of sources that are difficult to pin 
down. Second, the time-cost of the Trail Smelter case, which from 
the first claims in 1926 to the final arbitral award in 1941 took a solid 
fifteen years, was far higher than most environmental cases today 
can afford. 
In spite of these limitations, international lawyers continue to 
extrapolate "principles" from this venerable single precedent, like 
good generals rehearsing the wars of yesteryear. Yet, most trans-
national environmental regimes have learned to avoid the adversarial 
state liability approach; instead, they have used or developed differ-
ent methods of ensuring compliance with treaty obligations. A num-
ber of alternative channels and mechanisms are available for this 
purpose, including some promising innovative approaches. 
1. Local Remedies 
The Trail Smelter case developed into an international arbitration 
only because a deadlock arose between local legal rules: while noth-
ing prevented American air pollution victims from bringing a private 
law suit in Canada, the local Canadian courts in the 1930s would 
have refused-under an ancient House of Lords rule232-to take 
jurisdiction over suits based on damage to foreign land.233 On the 
other hand, Washington state law did not permit a foreign corpora-
tion to acquire smoke easements on Washington land.234 Had these 
domestic procedural obstacles been removed by more flexible rules 
governing foreign parties, the case probably never would have 
moved to intergovernmental arbitration. 
More recent environmental case law demonstrates that numerous 
local legal remedies are available to defuse trans boundary problems 
and to resolve the apparent conflicts between divergent legal sys-
232 Albert v. Fraser Cos., Ltd., 1 D.L.R. 39 (1937) (citing British South Africa Co. v. 
Companhia de Mo~ambique, App. Cas. 602 (1893)). 
233 See Willis, Jurisdiction of Courts: Action to Recover Damages for Injury to Foreign 
Land, 15 CAN. B. REV. 112, 113-19 (1937). 
234 See Read, supra note 230, at 223. 
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terns. For example, in the 1957 case of Poro v. Lorraine Basin 
Coalmines,235 which involved air pollution from a power plant in 
France harming residents in West Germany, a German appeals court 
chose to determine damages "in accordance with the law most fa-
vorable to the plaintiff"-in this instance, the French Civil Code. 236 
Significantly, the bulk of disputes over trans boundary pollution dam-
age along the Rhine River since 1975 were resolved by local reme-
dies, either through national courts or by out-of-court settlements 
and insurance. 237 
Of course, this approach also requires a degree of mutual recog-
nition to be given to foreign decisions-as, for instance, under the 
Brussels (1968) and Lugano (1988) Conventions on jurisdiction and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters in Eu-
rope.238 There must be certain guarantees for the status of foreign 
parties in local judicial and administrative proceedings, as under the 
1974 Nordic Environmental Protection Convention239 or the Outline 
Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Com-
munities or Authorities adopted in 1980 by the Council of Europe. 240 
The Recommendations on Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrim-
ination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, adopted in 1976 and 
1977 by the OECD,241 played a pilot role in this field; and a draft 
"convention on environmental impact assessment in a trans boundary 
context," now under preparation in the UN/ECE,242 aims at har-
235 Judgment of October 22, 1957, Oberlandesgericht (appellate court), Saarbriicken, 11 
NJW 752 (1958). For an English summary, see Sand, The Role of Domestic Procedures in 
Transnational Environmental Disputes, in OECD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER 
POLLUTION 146 (H. van Edig ed. 1977). 
236 See S. MCCAFFREY, PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR TRANSFRONTIER ENVIRONMENTAL DIS-
TURBANCES (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No.8, 1975); Bunge, Transboun-
dary Cooperation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, in TRANSBOUNDARY 
AIR POLLUTION: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE COOPERATION OF STATES 181 (C. 
Flinterman, B. Kwiatkowska & J. Lammers eds. 1986). 
237 See Lammers, supra note 36, at 451-56; Darrell, Killing the Rhine: Immoral, but Is It 
Illegal?, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 421 (1989). 
238 European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969); Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, European 
Communities-European Free Trade Association, 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989). 
239 Feb. 19, 1974, 1092 U.N.T.S. 279--305. 
240 For background see THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC COLLOQUY ON CROSS-
BORDER RELATIONS: EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (S. Ercmann ed. 
1987). 
241 OECD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION, supra note 235, at 11--34. 
242 U.N. Doc. ENVWAJR.36 (1990), to be adopted by the Senior Advisers to ECE Govern-
ments on Environmental and Water Problems, at their fourth session in Espoo (Finland) in 
February 1991. 
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monizing procedures for environmental planning and decisionmaking 
in border regions. Opening local remedies to foreign parties can go 
a long way toward de-escalating trans boundary disputes to their 
ordinary neighborhood level. 243 
2. Complaints and Custodial Action 
As an alternative to legal action against the responsible party, 
recourse to a non-judicial international institution may provide a 
first-choice remedy when environmental agreements are infringed. 
Under the non-compliance procedure developed for the 1987 Mon-
treal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (Mon-
treal Protocol),244 complaints by one or more parties will be filed 
initially with the UNEP Secretariat, which will gather additional 
information and eventually submit the file to a five-party "imple-
mentation committee. "245 But even though this proposed procedure 
was very cautiously defined as non-judicial and non-confrontational, 
a number of states already cautioned that "any supranational body 
to review data would be unacceptable,"246 which bodes ill for the 
chances of such a mechanism. 
A much bolder step toward collective compliance control was taken 
by the 1957 Rome Treaty establishing the EEC.247 Article 155 made 
the EEC Commission the guardian of the Treaty's implementation, 
and article 169 empowered it to initiate proceedings against any 
Member State in case of infringements, sanctioned if nec_essary by 
formal action in the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg. 248 
Over the past ten years, this "custodial" procedure has become one 
of the most important means of enforcing EEC environmental stan-
dards. 
243 See LEIVE, supra note 113, vol. II, at 584-88; A. LEVIN, PROTECTING THE HUMAN 
ENVIRONMENT: PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES FOR PREVENTING AND RESOLVING INTER-
NATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 31-38 (1977); Bilder, The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of 
the International Law of the Environment, in 144 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES 
OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 139-224 (1975); R. FISHER, IMPROV-
ING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 214-22 (1981). 
2014 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
2015 Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, supra note 32, 
Annex III: Non-Compliance Procedure (as adopted in London, June 1990). 
246 Report of the First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal Experts on Non-
Compliance with the Montreal Protocol, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.I13, para. 14 (1989). 
See Note, Non-Compliance with Ozone Agreement, 19 ENVTL. POL'y & L. 147-49 (1989). 
2017 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1957). 
248 See H. AUDRETSCH, SUPERVISION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1978); Mertens de 
Wilmars & Verougstraete, Proceedings Against Member States for Failure to Fulfill Their 
Obligations, 7 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 385-406 (1970). 
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The EEC infringement proceedings249 comprise three stages: as a 
first step, the Commission sends "letters of formal notice" to Member 
States that fail to enact or apply a Community directive, or to report 
on its enactment or application. After giving the Member State an 
opportunity to respond, the Commission next can render a "reasoned 
opinion" confirming the infringement in light of all the facts gathered. 
If the Member State still does not comply, the Commission then may 
refer the matter to the European Court of Justice. During 1988, the 
Commission issued ninety-three letters of formal notice, seventy-
one reasoned opinions, and eleven references to the court concerning 
infringements of EEC environmental directives (s'ome seventy of 
which were in force at that time).250 A country-by-country compar-
ison of infringement proceedings pending at the end of 1989 is given 
in Table 2. 
What may be the most significant feature of this procedure is 
mentioned nowhere in the Treaty and evolved only gradually during 
its implementation. More than half of the infringement proceedings 
initiated against Member States were based not on the Commission's 
own monitoring of compliance, but on citizen complaints-from pri-
vate individuals, associations (such as Greenpeace and Friends of 
the Earth), or municipalities. 251 As a result of public information on 
the complaints procedure and the establishment of a "complaints 
registry" within the Commission Secretariat in Brussels, the number 
of environmental complaints rose dramatically-from 10 in 1982 to 
190 in 1988 and to 460 in 1989.252 While complaints are usually based 
on local non-compliance with EEC standards, some have wider ef-
fects: a single complaint by a resident in one of the United Kingdom's 
two non-attainment areas with regard to the 1980 EEC Directive 
on Air Quality Limit Values and Guide Values for Sulphur Dioxide 
and Suspended Particulates253 thus triggered a Commission investi-
249 See Scheuing, supra note 78, at 192; Pernice, Kompetenzordnung und Handlungsbefug-
nisse der Europaischen Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des Umwelt- und Technikrechts [The 
European Community's system of competences and authority to act in the field of environ-
mental and technological law), 22 DIE VERWALTUNG 1-54 (1989). 
250 Sixth Annual Report to the European Parliament on Commission Monitoring of the 
Application of Community Law-1988, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 330) 1 (1989); see also 
supra note 122 and accompanying text. The previous (fifth) report appears in 31 O.J. EUR. 
COMM. (No. C 310) 1 (1988); see also Kraemer, Du contr6le de l'application des directives 
communautaires en matiere de l'environnement, REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 22-40 (1988). 
251 See Pernice, supra note 249, at 40. 
252 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, INFORMATION MEMO P/90/5 (Feb. 8, 
1990). 
253 Council Directive 80/779/EEC of July 15, 1980, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 130 
(1980); see also Smeets, Air Quality Limits and Guide Values for Sulphur Dioxide and 
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Table 2. Proceedings for Infringements of EEC Environmental Directives. 
EEC Court de· 
EEC Commission action cisions pur· 
pursuant to Art. 169 suant to Ar. 169 
pending as of 31.12.1989 against member 
state 
Letters of Reasoned References to 
notice opinions EEC Court (1981-1989) 
Belgium 27 8 11 13 
Denmark 5 - - 1 
France 28 6 7 1 
Germany, Fed. Rep. 13 8 8 8 
Greece 37 5 3 -
Ireland 16 5 - -
Italy 17 16 7 8 
Luxembourg 9 2 1 -
Netherlands 18 5 2 4 
Portugal 10 4 - 8 
Spain 45 3 -
United Kingdom 18 8 5 -
TOTALS 242 76 44 29 
Source: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 252, at Annex 2; 
Sixth Annual Commission Report, supra note 250, at 38. 
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gation that led to infringement proceedings against seven Member 
States. 254 
Significantly, the EEC has no powers of physical enforcement 
comparable to those of a national government. Although virtually 
all of the more than thirty judgments rendered by the European 
Court of Justice in environmental infringement proceedings since 
1982 went against the defendant Member States and upheld the 
Commission's opinion, not all led to compliance. In the 1988 case of 
Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium,255 for instance, the court noted 
Suspended Particulates: A European Community Directive, 1 ENVTL. MONITORING & As-
SESSMENT 373-82 (1982). 
254 Haigh, Impact of the EEC Environmental Programme: The British Example, 4 CONN. 
J. INT'L L. 453, 458 n.11 (1989); see also N. HAIGH, EEC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND 
BRITAIN (2d rev. ed. 1989). 
255 Court of Justice of the European Communities, Joined Cases 227185 to 230185, Reports 
of Cases Before the Court (1988) 1-12; summary in 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 37) 4 (1988). 
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that Belgium had failed to fulfill its obligations under article 171 of 
the Treaty by refusing, in defiance of earlier (1982) judgments of the 
court, to adopt the measures necessary to implement four EEC 
directives on waste disposal. The mere opening of EEC action can, 
however, have internal political and economic consequences in Mem-
ber States. In the United Kingdom, the government's plans for 
privatization of local water management agencies were stalled in 
part because of pending EEC infringement proceedings, when it 
turned out that some areas scheduled for privatization did not meet 
EEC water quality standards.256 As a result of this growing impact 
on local environmental quality, the "custodial action" procedure of 
the EEC Commission has evolved from a three-stage to a four-stage 
process: the optional first stage in most cases is now a citizen com-
plaint. 257 
3. Environmental Audits 
Besides judicial review, international organizations have devel-
oped other forms of compliance control. Probably the body with the 
most such experience is the International Labor Organization (ILO), 
which has enacted and monitored a long line of multilateral conven-
tions since the 1920s-ranging from bans on white lead paint and 
other occupational health hazards to workplace protection from air 
pollution, radiation, and toxic chemicals.258 All these conventions 
contain provisions on dispute settlement that allow states to initiate 
complaints and ad hoc inquiries against other states for not observing 
the Treaty. However, a detailed study of ILO's enforcement record 
over more than sixty years shows that this adversarial procedure 
was used only rarely and then mostly for political potshots. 259 In-
stead, ILO Member States developed an entirely different procedure 
that turned out to be far more effective in enforcing compliance: 
annual or biennial reporting by governments, combined with regular 
256 Fin. Times, Apr. 7, 1989, at 2; see Sands, supra note 135, at 415 n.98. The proceedings 
in this case were triggered by a complaint from a non-governmental organization (Friends of 
the Earth). 
267 According to Kraemer, supra note 250, more than half of the infringement proceedings 
initiated by the Commission are based on complaints. 
26B For a summary of International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions and recommen-
dations on the working environment, see ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AN IN-DEPTH REVIEW, 
UNEP REPORT No.2, at 53-64 (1981). 
269 V. GHEBALI, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY ON THE 
EVOLUTION OF UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES (1989); see also A. ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (1971). 
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auditing by an independent technical committee of experts to ascer-
tain compliance in each Member State, followed by public debate of 
these audited reports by the Conference Committee on the Appli-
cation of Conventions and Recommendations. 260 
Over the years, the ILO "auditing" system-with the active par-
ticipation of both trade unions and employers' associations-has 
turned into a worldwide public hearing that clearly induces more 
compliance by governments than the threat of any intergovernmen-
tal legal action would. The UN Commission on Human Rights applies 
a similar procedure of country reports and public hearings ,261 in 
which non-governmental organizations (such as Amnesty Interna-
tional) play an active role. 
In the environmental field, the biennial Conference of the Parties 
to CITES262 has become a forum for international review of compli-
ance with the Treaty, again with massive non-government organi-
zation (NGO) support. Similarly, reviews of treaty implementation 
by parties to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution263 and its protocols are carried out and published regularly 
by the Executive Body for the Convention. 264 
In all these cases, periodic audits of compliance with agreed-upon 
international standards are well established. Essential to this pro-
cess is pUblicity. It facilitates collective review and mutual 
accountability265 by all Member States and, even more important, 
exposes governmental compliance reports to scrutiny by NGOs and, 
through them, by the pUblic. 266 
260 E. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF 
LL.O. EXPERIENCE (1966); see also Valticos, Contrale, in A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 332,340-44 (R.J. Dupuyed. 1988). 
261 See T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITIQUE 
OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS (1986); Bossyut, The Development of Special Procedures of 
the UN Commission for Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L.J. 179-210 (1985); Williams, The 
United Nations and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AT WORK 114-29 
(P. Taylor & A.J.R. Groom eds. 1988). 
262 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. The first major (four-years) review was 
published in 1987. The 1988 annual review was published in TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION, 
supra note 65; AIR POLLUTION STUDIES No.6, at 3-20, U.N. Sales No. E.90.III.E.33 (1989 
annual review) (1990). 
265 See Brown & Fabian, Toward Mutual Accountability in the Nonterrestrial Realms, 29 
INT'L ORG. 877 (1975). 
266 See, e.g., UMWELT No. 11, at 524 (1989) (discussing the extensive parliamentary ques-
tions by the "Greens" on CITES implementation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in 
preparation of the seventh Conference of the Parties). See also LEIVE, supra note 113, at vol. 
II, 576 (concluding that publicizing non-compliance would effect a "mobilization of shame to 
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The concept of environmental auditing also has been taken up 
directly by such NGOs as Friends of the Earth,267 and by industry. 
Several major transnational corporations-at least partly in response 
to the Bhopal shock-now carry out regular environmental audits to 
ensure that regulatory requirements and long-term environmental 
liabilities (such as legal waste-disposal duties) are accurately re-
flected in their subsidiaries' balance sheets. 268 In November 1988, 
the Executive Board of the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) adopted a position paper on environmental auditing for busi-
ness organizations, reflecting experience in countries and companies 
where the practice is already well established. 269 A fundamental 
difference remains, however, between the more limited scope of 
auditing as an internal business management technique and the idea 
of public review, which emerges as the key element of the interna-
tional environmental audit procedures presented here. Inherent in 
the latter is public disclosure as a means of ensuring democratic 
control over the implementation of agreed-upon international stan-
dards. 
One strong point of environmental audits is timing. Audits can 
make a difference before things have gone seriously wrong-unlike 
traditional judicial review mechanisms based on liability, which can 
only intervene after the fact. Considering the clear need to make 
environmental controls preventive rather than corrective, now may 
be the time to envisage a global auditing body that would periodically 
evaluate the performance of states and organizations in complying 
with their international obligations. Rather than relying on ad hoc 
review by a tribunal, where "action" would turn inevitably into 
confrontation, it may be preferable to assign this function to a per-
manent intergovernmental body-such as the United Nations Trust-
eeship Council, as recently suggested by Maurice Strong, Secretary 
General of the UN Conference on Environment and Development. 270 
induce compliance"); Handl & Lutz, An International Policy Perspective on the Trade of 
Hazardous Materials and Technologies, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 351, 373 (1989) (stressing the 
importance of public scrutiny). 
267 Local environmental audits have been organized by Friends of the Earth at the county 
level in the United Kingdom since 1988. 
268 See the UNEP survey of environmental auditing practices in 11 INDUSTRY & ENV'T no. 
4, at 3 (1988); Palmisano, Environmental Auditing: Past, Present and Future, 1 ENVTL. 
AUDITOR 7-20 (1989); THE ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT: A GREEN FILTER FOR COMPANY POLI-
CIES, PLANTS, PROCESSES AND PRODUCTS (WWFIUK 1989). 
269 See 19 ENVTL. POL'y & L. 82 (1989) (text of the 56th session of the ICC Executive 
Board, Paris, Nov. 29, 1988). 
270 Strong, The United Nations in an Interdependent World, INT'L AFF. no. 1, at 11, 20 
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As in the field of standard-setting and regulation, more imaginative 
approaches to compliance control are needed today than those drawn 
from outdated legal textbooks. An obvious and largely untapped 
source is the rich procedural experience of existing international 
institutions. 271 
IV. OUTLOOK: A VIEW FROM THE ANTHILL 
In the current international debate on environmental priorities in 
the face of global change, far too many hopes seem pinned on some 
new utopia of world government. It is most unlikely that problems 
of this dimension-such as climate modification--can be resolved by 
organizational restructuring alone, nor for that matter by yet an-
other epic codification like the Law of the Sea. Given the urgency of 
the task, the most expedient and most economic course of action 
would be to activate and accelerate all available international ma-
chinery without waiting for new global institutions. 
The obvious disadvantage of relying on the existing structure is 
its sheer complexity. We are dealing with an aggregate, rather than 
a system, of multiple environmental regimes. Ernst Haas has com-
pared it to an anthill,272 but the analogy may be euphemistic consid-
ering the well-organized hierarchies of social insects. Making envi-
ronmental standard-setting and implementation coherent will 
require more than further coordination within the United Nations 
family of organizations; indeed, the whole range of global and re-
gional institutions must be involved. The small "Centre for Our 
Common Future" set up in Geneva in 1988 to oversee follow-up to 
the Brundtland Report has already made an impressive start in this 
direction. 273 
An advantage of the present structure-and one that hopefully 
sets it apart from the stereotype of insect societies-is its openness 
and adaptiveness to change. Any new institutional arrangements for 
(1989); Statement by M. Strong to the World Federation of United Nations Associations, 
Halifax, June 5, 1988; see also Franck, Soviet Initiatives: U.S. Responses-New Opportunities 
for Reviving the United Nations System, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 541 (1989). 
271 See Thacher, International Mechanisms and Global Changes, 14 ENVTL. CONSERV. 191 
(1987). 
272 See Haas, supra note 6, at 389. 
273 BRUNDTLAND BULLETIN, No.6 (Dec. 1989) (regular reports on follow-up activities). 
The Centre has succeeded in mobilizing worldwide support for the Brundtland Report's 
concept of "sustainable development" -among intergovernmental and non-governmental orga-
nizations, especially through a network of more than 120 "working partners" from all sectors. 
See id. 
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environmental governance should seek to preserve and enhance this 
capacity. Practical devices for this purpose include the built-in re-
view schedules that have appeared in a number of recent environ-
mental agreements: 
• The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the 
Ozone Layer stipulated that "beginning in 1990, and at least every 
four years thereafter, the Parties shall assess the control measures 
... on the basis of available scientific, environmental, technical and 
economic information. "274 Four assessment panels, coordinated by 
an intergovernmental "Open-Ended Working Group,"275 were set up 
in 1989 and reported to the second meeting of the Parties in June 
1990.276 
• The 1988 Sofia Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution provides for regular reviews of the agree-
ment, starting no later than one year after its entry into force. It 
also says that negotiations on further steps must start no later than 
six months after entry into force and "[take] into account the best 
available scientific and technological developments. "277 In anticipa-
tion of this process, an intergovernmental "Working Group on Abate-
ment Strategies" began to meet in 1989 and will report to the Ex-
ecutive Body for the Convention in November 1991. 
• The 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal has scheduled 
an evaluation of the treaty's effectiveness three years after its entry 
into force and at least every six years thereafter. The evaluation 
mandate includes the possible "adoption of a complete or partial ban 
of trans boundary movements of hazardous wastes and other wastes 
in light of the latest scientific, environmental, technical and economic 
information. "278 
This new generation of all-out reviews-mirrored in the broad 
remit of the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 
1992279-clearly amounts to more than a routine inspection and main-
tenance service.280 If the mandate of a review is policy re-orientation 
274 Montreal Protocol, art. 6, supra note 18, at 1556. 
275 See 8upm note 32 and accompanying text. 
276 See id. 
277 See Nitrogen Oxides Protocol, arts. 2(3), 5, supra note 33, at 216. 
278 See Basel Convention, art. 15(7), supm note 31, at 670. 
279 G.A. Res. 44/228 (1989). 
280 The present analysis draws on an unpublished study of "revision clauses" in environ-
mental agreements, prepared for the German Federal Parliament's Commission of Inquiry on 
Protection of the Atmosphere. See L. Giindling, Study at Max Planck Institute for Compar-
ative Public Law and International Law (Heidelberg 1989). 
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in light of future knowledge and experience, it must include the 
option of consequential institutional change. What emerges, then, is 
indeed close to the new "fluid" model of environmental regimes 
envisaged by Jessica Tuchman Mathews, as "a rolling process of 
intermediate or self-adjusting agreements that respond quickly to 
growing scientific understanding."281 Even though open-ended com-
mitments of this kind are still viewed with apprehension by diplo-
mats, the "feedback loop" seems well on its way to becoming an 
established instrument of international environmental law-with a 
new obligation emerging for governments to take part in a deliber-
ate, pre-programmed process of institutional learning. 
281 Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 162, 176 (1989). 
